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ANIMAL LAW—CULTIVATING COMPASSIONATE LAW: UNLOCK
LABORATORY DOOR AND SHINING LIGHT ON THE INADE
QUACIES & CONTRADICTIONS OF THE ANIMAL WELFARE ACT

ING THE

“Universally, humans exploit and kill other animals because
legally they can.”1
INTRODUCTION
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) re
ported that there were 124,385 nonhuman primates confined in lab
oratories in 2009.2 Of those confined, 70,444 primates were used in
laboratory research.3 Of those used in research, 1,711 primates
were used in painful procedures, but their pain was not alleviated
because pain-relieving drugs would have interfered with or compro
mised the research.4
1. Joan Dunayer, From Vivisection to Animal Rights, 13 ORG. & ENV’T 429, 430
(2000).
2. ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERV., U. S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AN
NUAL REPORT ANIMAL USAGE BY FISCAL YEAR, PAIN TYPE: TOTAL 2 (2011) [herein
after PAIN TYPE: TOTAL 2009], available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_welfare/
efoia/downloads/2009_Animals_Used_In_Research.pdf; ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH IN
SPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ANNUAL REPORT ANIMAL USAGE BY FISCAL
YEAR, PAIN TYPE: ANIMAL NOT YET USED 2 (2011) [hereinafter PAIN TYPE: ANIMALS
NOT YET USED 2009], available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_welfare/efoia/
downloads/2009_Animals_Used_In_Research.pdf. The USDA reported that in 2009 a
total of 1,131,206 nonhuman animals were confined in laboratories; 979,772 were used
in laboratory research. PAIN TYPE: TOTAL, supra, at 2; PAIN TYPE: ANIMALS NOT YET
USED 2009, supra, at 2.
3. PAIN TYPE: TOTAL 2009, supra note 2, at 1-2.
4. ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AN
NUAL REPORT ANIMAL USAGE BY FISCAL YEAR, PAIN TYPE: WITH PAIN, NO DRUGS 2
(2011) [hereinafter PAIN TYPE: WITH PAIN, NO DRUGS 2009], available at http://www.
aphis.usda.gov/animal_welfare/efoia/downloads/2009_Animals_Used_In_Research.pdf.
This is an increase from 2008, when 1,037 primates were used in painful procedures, but
their pain was not alleviated. ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERV., U.S.
DEP’T OF AGRIC., ANNUAL REPORT ANIMAL USAGE BY FISCAL YEAR, PAIN TYPE:
TOTAL 2 (2011), available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_welfare/efoia/down
loads/2008_Animals_Used_In_Research.pdf. In 2009, of the approximate one million
animals used in research, 76,441 were used in painful procedures, but their pain was not
alleviated because pain relieving drugs would have interfered with or compromised the
research. PAIN TYPE: WITH PAIN, NO DRUGS 2009, supra. In 2009, there were 26,758
primates that were used in painful procedures and received pain relieving drugs; a total
of 354,853 animals were used in painful procedures and received pain relieving drugs.
ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ANNUAL RE
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The use of primates in laboratory research5 is supported by his
torical and legal precedent. The purpose of the Laboratory Animal
Welfare Act (LAWA), the first federal law protecting animals used
in laboratory research, was, in relevant part, “to insure that certain
animals intended for use in research facilities are provided humane
care and treatment.”6 Designated as property, animals are per
ceived, by some, as voiceless “things.”7 Primates, however, have
emotional, social, and intellectual lives: they think, communicate,
learn, have memories, grieve, empathize, and suffer.8 And despite
widespread agreement that some primates are intelligent, emo
tional, social beings that deserve some level of protection,9 there is
ANIMAL USAGE BY FISCAL YEAR, PAIN TYPE: WITH PAIN, WITH DRUGS 2 (2011),
available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_welfare/efoia/downloads/2009_Animals_
Used_In_Research.pdf.
5. Although this Note is primarily focused on primates in laboratories, primates
are also confined and used in zoos, for exhibition in circuses, and for entertainment in
television, commercials, and movies. The film Any Which Way You Can, for example,
“led to the death of Clyde, the orangutan who was [Clint] Eastwood’s sidekick.” Lor
raine L. Fischer, Note, “No Animals Were Harmed . . .”: Protecting Chimpanzees From
Cruelty Behind the Curtain, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 405, 416 (2005) (“Clyde
was essentially beaten to death by his trainer for not paying attention.”).
6. Laboratory Animal Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 89-544, § 1, 80 Stat. 350, 350
(1966) (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (2006)) (emphasis added); see also
Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2131.
7. See, e.g., GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 166
(2005); STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANI
MALS 4 (2000) [hereinafter RATTLING THE CAGE]; Steven M. Wise, The Legal
Thinghood of Nonhuman Animals, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 471 (1996) [hereinaf
ter The Legal Thinghood of Nonhuman Animals] (tracing the historical origins of ani
mals’ legal status as things).
8. See, e.g., Steven M. Wise, The Entitlement of Chimpanzees to the Common Law
Writs of Habeas Corpus and De Homine Replegiando, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
219, 227 (2007) [hereinafter The Entitlement of Chimpanzees]; Adam Kolber, Note,
Standing Upright: The Moral and Legal Standing of Humans and Other Apes, 54 STAN.
L. REV. 163, 171-74 (2001); The Gorilla Foundation, Koko’s Mourning for Michael,
KOKO.ORG (Aug. 2, 2002), http://www.koko.org/world/mourning_koko.html. A discus
sion of the intellectual, emotional, and social lives of other animals is beyond the scope
of this Note.
9. Congress has found that “[g]reat apes are highly intelligent and social animals
and research laboratory environments involving invasive research cannot meet their
complex social and psychological needs.” Great Ape Protection Act, S. 3694, 111th
Cong. (2010); Great Ape Protection Act, H.R. 1326, 111th Cong. (2009). According to
a 2005 public opinion poll, “4 out of 5 (83 percent) of the U.S. public recognize chim
panzees as highly intelligent, social individuals who have an extensive capacity to com
municate.” U.S. SENATE, DEPARTMENTS OF LABOR, HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
EDUCATION, AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007:
WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF NONDEPARTMENTAL WITNESSES BEFORE THE SENATE SUB
COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS (2006) (statement of Project
R&R), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg59104229/pdf/CHRG
109shrg59104229.pdf. According to a 2001 poll, eighty-five percent of Americans “be
PORT
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inadequate protective legislation.10 Thus, every day in the United
States, nonhuman primates suffer physical and mental anguish that
human primates witness, are complicit in, or declare necessary to
advance the quality of human life.
A common justification cited for using animals in research is
that it is necessary to advance scientific knowledge, which will en
sure human health and safety.11 This argument rests on the belief
that harm to animals must be balanced against human benefit. This
Note rejects that perspective because speciesism12 tips the scale in
favor of human interests at the expense of animal welfare. As this
Note will illustrate through its examination of the Animal Welfare
Act,13 this balancing results in some animals being subjected to
painful and distressing procedures.
One justification cited for using primates in laboratory re
search is their genetic likeness to humans.14 Primates, however,
share more than genetics with humans. In the 1970s, a pioneering
group of primates learned American Sign Language from pri
matologist Roger Fouts.15 Some of these chimpanzees, among
lieve . . . that chimpanzees have ‘complex social, intellectual, and emotional lives.’ Most
(fifty-one percent) believe chimpanzees should be ‘treated similar to children, with a
guardian to look after their interests,’ as opposed to being treated either as human
adults (nine percent) or as property (twenty-three percent).” The Legal Thinghood of
Nonhuman Animals, supra note 7, at 239 (citations omitted). See infra Part I (chimpanzees and gorillas demonstrate they have the capacity to learn sign language); Part I
(gorillas grieve the loss of their companions); Part I (rhesus monkeys recall memory).
10. See Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159.
11. See, e.g., David R. Schmahmann & Lori J. Polacheck, The Case Against Rights
for Animals, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 747, 755-60 (1995). Contra C. RAY GREEK
& JEAN SWINGLE GREEK, SACRED COWS AND GOLDEN GEESE: THE HUMAN COST OF
EXPERIMENTS ON ANIMALS (2000) (challenging the belief that animal research is neces
sary and beneficial to humans, and illuminating the disadvantages and dangers).
12. Speciesism is “discrimination based on species” that relies on the assumption
that humans are superior to nonhuman animals. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 1198 (11th ed. 2003) [hereinafter MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S].
13. Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159.
14. For a discussion of chimpanzee and human genome comparison see, for ex
ample, The Chimpanzee Sequencing and Analysis Consortium, Initial Sequence of the
Chimpanzee Genome and Comparison with the Human Genome, 437 NATURE 69 (Sept.
1, 2005), available at http://www.humanesociety.org/assets/pdfs/animals_laboratories/
chimpanzee_research/human_chimpanzee_genome.pdf; see also Bueckner v. Hamel,
886 S.W.2d 368, 377 (Tex. App. 1994) (Andell, J., concurring) (“Scientific research has
provided a wealth of understanding to us that we cannot rightly ignore. We now know
that mammals share with us a great many emotive and cognitive characteristics, and
that the higher primates are very similar to humans neurologically and genetically.”).
15. See generally ROGER FOUTS & STEPHEN TUKEL MILLS, NEXT OF KIN (1997)
(describing his personal and professional experience with Washoe, the first chimpanzee
to communicate with humans using American Sign Language, and other chimpanzees;
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them Booee and Bruno, were sold in the 1980s to a biomedical re
search facility, the New York Laboratory for Experimental
Medicine and Surgery in Primates (LEMSIP), for hepatitis re
search.16 At LEMSIP,
each chimp was locked in a solitary cage that was five by five by
six feet—the size of a coat closet. The steel-bar-bottom box hung
from the ceiling, like a birdcage, dangling above the floor so that
the chimp’s feces could drop through the cage onto plastic sheets
below. There were two rows of these hanging cages, facing each
other across a walkway. The chimps could see one another and
call—or sign—to their friends, but there was no group contact or
access to the outdoors . . . . The entire facility was designed to
make it easier for the workers to have access to the chimps’
blood.17

Visitors reported that the chimpanzees continued to sign and asked
the laboratory technicians “for food, drinks, cigarettes, and the keys
to their cages.”18 When a student of Fouts visited, Bruno signed
“KEY OUT.”19 He clearly communicated that he wanted out of
the cage he was confined in.20 Bruno, unfortunately, died at
LEMSIP.21
Booee was spared the same fate. Thirteen years after Booee
and Fouts were separated, ABC News 20/20 aired a program called
The Great Ape Project, which was about the ethics of using chim
panzees in biomedical research.22 “Millions of viewers watch[ed],
detailing chimpanzees’ intellectual and emotional capacity; and drawing attention to the
cruel imprisonment they face in laboratories).
16. Id. at 283-84; The Legal Thinghood of Nonhuman Animals, supra note 7, at
280; see also NEW ENGLAND ANTI-VIVISECTION SOC’Y, LEMSIP, PROJECT R&R: RE
LEASE & RESTITUTION FOR CHIMPANZEES IN U.S. LABORATORIES, www.releasechimps.
org/labs/labs-closed/lemsip/ (last visited June 11, 2011).
17. FOUTS & MILLS, supra note 15, at 283-84.
18. Id. at 284.
19. Id. at 354.
20. The Legal Thinghood of Nonhuman Animals, supra note 7, at 280. Feminist
theorists Catharine A. MacKinnon and Josephine Donovan are among those who have
noted that animals are clearly communicating their dissent to human exploitation.
Josephine Donovan, Animal Rights and Feminist Theory, 15 SIGNS 350, 375 (1990) (“We
should not kill, eat, torture, and exploit animals because they do not want to be so
treated, and we know that. If we listen we can hear them.”); Catharine A. MacKinnon,
Of Mice and Men: A Feminist Fragment on Animal Rights, in ANIMAL RIGHTS 270
(Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum, eds. 2004) (“[A]nimals dissent from human
hegemony . . . . They vote with their feet by running away. They bite back, scream in
alarm, withhold affection, approach warily, fly and swim off.”).
21. FOUTS & MILLS, supra note 15, at 358.
22. Id. at 353. The Great Ape Project aired on May 5, 1995. Id. at 356.
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overwhelmed, as Booee recognize[d] and ecstatically greet[ed] Dr.
Fouts.”23 After the show aired, donations from viewers flooded
into ABC to fund Booee’s retirement.24 Reflecting on the 20/20
show, Fouts stated, “For most people it was their very first glimpse
into this secretive world, and they were outraged to see a thinking,
loving, signing chimpanzee dangling in a cage without companion
ship or comfort.”25 Five months later, as a result of massive public
outcry, Booee and eight other chimpanzees were released to a non
profit wildlife sanctuary in California.26 In contrast to their living
quarters at LEMSIP, Booee and the eight other chimpanzees’ new
home had “large, airy, and sunlit rooms with sagebrush views.
There [we]re climbing ropes, and enrichment activities, including
music, books, television, magazines, and toys.”27 These chimpan
zees were retired to a sanctuary because the public demanded it.
Public awareness about the treatment of animals used in re
search facilities is a powerful source of change. The passage of the
LAWA,28 the predecessor of the Animal Welfare Act (AWA), for
example, was largely influenced by the public’s response to media
about the horrific conditions dogs were kept in before being sold to
research facilities and laboratories.29 Subsequent amendments to
the AWA were similarly driven by public pressure.30 As public
awareness has increased about the treatment of animals in research
facilities, the public has demanded legislative change. Congress,
however, has responded by passing legislation that while accounting
for competing goals only “symbolic[ally]”31 protects animals’
welfare.
23. New England Anti-Vivisection Soc’y, A Chronology of Key Events in the Sci
entific Use of Chimpanzees in the U.S., PROJECT R&R: RELEASE & RESTITUTION FOR
CHIMPANZEES IN U.S. LABORATORIES, http://www.releasechimps.org/pdfs/chronology
of-key-events.pdf (last visited June 11, 2011); see also FOUTS & MILLS, supra note 15, at
356. Fouts, reflecting on the reunion, stated, “Thirteen years in a hellhole and he’s still
forgiving, still guileless. Booee still loved me, in spite of everything that humans had
done to him.” Id.
24. FOUTS & MILLS, supra note 15, at 356.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 356-57.
27. Id. at 357.
28. Laboratory Animal Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 89-544, 80 Stat. 350 (1966) (cur
rent version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (2006)).
29. See Stan Wayman, Concentration Camps for Dogs, LIFE, Feb. 4, 1966, at 23
29; see also BERNARD UNTI, PROTECTING ALL ANIMALS: A FIFTY-YEAR HISTORY OF
THE HUMANE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES 71 (2004).
30. See infra notes 121-141 and accompanying text.
31. FRANCIONE, supra note 7, at 208-11.
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Historically, the treatment of animals was largely visible “and
thus judged by other humans.”32 Today, a huge obstacle that the
animal law community faces is that people do not know what goes
on behind the closed doors of research facilities. “[H]arm done to
animals is rendered invisible for most people . . . by massive ideo
logical screening that shields them from the suffering animal in the
laboratory . . . .”33 David Favre, law professor, argues that “[t]he
public would never support what happens to animals today, and for
that reason, more and more animals are hidden away under condi
tions of which the public is not aware.”34 Wayne Pacelle, president
and CEO of the Humane Society of the United States, commenting
on a recent undercover investigation at the New Iberia Research
Center of the University of Louisiana at Lafayette, stated,
The only reason that this torment and lifetime captivity of chimps
is occurring at this lab is because the public doesn’t know. If they
could see the behavior of Sturling [a twenty-one year old chim
panzee who has been permanently removed from research be
cause he has stress-induced psychosis] and the emotional trauma
that he’s gone through, and if they could see what’s happening to
these other chimps, any decent person would not tolerate it and
they would demand an end.35

Public awareness about the treatment of animals in research facili
ties is essential to ending their confinement. Thus, the areas of in
adequate protection and contradictory legislative language must be
brought to light.
Whether a particular social movement is embraced or rejected
by an individual is, in part, a result of the information available to
that individual. An individual’s well of knowledge shapes her
moral and ethical ideology. The moral and ethical beliefs of a soci
ety shape its laws. “[T]he law evolves from the way society thinks
32. David Favre, Integrating Animal Interests into our Legal System, 10 ANIMAL
L. 87, 91 (2004).
33. THE FEMINIST CARE TRADITION IN ANIMAL ETHICS 3 (Josephine Donovan &
Carol J. Adams, eds. 2007).
34. Favre, supra note 32, at 91.
35. Primate Investigation, Undercover Investigation at Research Lab, HUMANE
SOC’Y OF THE U.S., 6:10-6:32 (2009), http://hsus.feedroom.com/?fr_story=478975d8a33d
5737fb8cb89030361b7fda24a9d9&rf=rss (“February 2009: An undercover investigation
by the Humane Society of the United States reveals psychological suffering of primates
in research laboratories.”). Individuals in the animal welfare, rights, and law commu
nity are sometimes witness to disturbing visual and audio evidence of animal suffering
on a regular basis. For an analysis of the trauma experienced by those working in the
field, see Taimie L. Bryant, Trauma, Law, and Advocacy For Animals, 1 J. ANIMAL L.
& ETHICS 63 (2006).
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and behaves. Thus, when public attitudes change so does the law.
Nevertheless, this change is often slow because the forces of conser
vatism are often stronger in the short term than those of reform.”36
When the majority of society recognizes their moral obligation to
treat animals with compassion, dignity, and respect, the law will re
flect that commitment to protect them.
This Note will discuss the social movement to confer legal pro
tections and rights on animals in an effort to end their suffering in
laboratories from invasive research, and will argue that primates,37
in particular, should be retired to sanctuaries where they will be
guaranteed a right to dignity and a life free from confinement and
torture.38 Part I will reveal a glimpse of the range of research con
ducted on primates. In addition, Part I will offer examples of pri
mates’ intellectual abilities and emotional capacities. Part II will
take account of competing theory—animal welfare theory, animal
rights theory, and feminist animal care theory—and will trace the
evolution of protective legislation. Part II will also consider the sta
tus of animals as property, legal personhood, and legal standing as a
means of gaining access to the courts to enforce protective legisla
tion. Part III will compare evolving societal mindsets in the context
of the women’s rights movement and the animal welfare and rights
movement. In addition, Part III will analyze protective legislation,
specifically provisions of the AWA that relate to painful laboratory
research. And Part III will conclude that current protective legisla
tion is human-focused, inadequate, and wrought with
contradictions.
36. Valdelane Azevedo Clayton, A Habeas Corpus on Behalf of a Chimpanzee,
ANIMALLAW.INFO (citation omitted), http://www.animallaw.info/nonus/pleadings/
pb_pdf/Habeas%20Corpus%20on%20Behalf%20of%20a%20Chimp%20Rev2.pdf
(last visited June 11, 2011) (translation of Suiça’s habeas petition) (pages not
numbered).
37. The focus of this Note on primates, and great apes in particular, is a recogni
tion by the author of the forces of conservatism. In light of this, primates are most
likely the first animals to be freed from invasive research. A discussion of ending the
exploitation of other animals in laboratories is beyond the scope of this Note.
38. Dignity is defined as “the quality or state of being worthy, honored, or es
teemed.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S, supra note 12, at 350. This Note understands dignity
as being honored and treated with respect by being given autonomy and control over
one’s physical being. Black’s Law Dictionary defines torture as “[t]he infliction of in
tense pain to the body or mind to punish, to extract a confession or information, or to
obtain sadistic pleasure.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1627 (9th ed. 2009). MerriamWebster defines torture as “anguish of body or mind.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S, supra
note 12, at 1320. This Note understands torture as the infliction of intense pain to the
body or mind of an animal to extract information. Information, in this context, is scien
tific knowledge extracted from the bodies of animals.
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This Note aims to illuminate that the AWA, as currently en
acted and administratively enforced, values human interests over,
and ironically at the expense of, animal welfare. This Note suggests
that ending painful and distressing laboratory research requires
deconstructing speciesist ideology that legitimizes the use of ani
mals in research and cultivating compassion through awareness,
which in turn should effect change in the law.
I. NONHUMAN PRIMATES USED IN RESEARCH ARE
INTELLIGENT, EMOTIONAL, SOCIAL BEINGS
Primates39 have been used in a wide
distressing behavioral studies, medical
maceutical experiments such as studies
maternal and sensory deprivation,41 the

range of painful and
research, and phar
on drug addiction,40
effect of space tra

39. Macaques, in particular the rhesus monkey, an Old World monkey native to
Asia, are the most commonly used primate in laboratory research in the United States.
Questions and Answers About Monkeys Used in Research, THE HUMANE SOC’Y OF THE
U.S., Sept. 28, 2009, http://www.humanesociety.org/animals/monkeys/qa/questions_
answers.html#What_types_of_monkeys_are_most_frequentl; see also Non-Human Pri
mates Used in Research, AMERICAN ANTI-VIVISECTION SOC’Y, http://www.aavs.org/site/
c.bkLTKfOSLhK6E/b.6456925/k.63CB/Nonhuman_Primates_Used_in_Research.htm
(last visited June 11, 2011). In addition, marmosets, squirrel monkeys, and tamarins are
among those species frequently used in research. Questions and Answers About
Monkeys Used in Research, supra.
40. See, e.g., Lori Whitten, Low Dopamine Receptor Availability May Promote
Cocaine Addiction, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE (Apr. 2009), http://drugabuse.gov/
NIDA_notes/NNvol22N3/Low.html. Harvard University, for example, has conducted
numerous studies on cocaine addiction using primates. See Bertha K. Madras, et al.,
Dopamine Systems in Primate Brain: Addiction, Parkinson’s Disease and Attention Defi
cit Hyperactivity Disorder, HARVARD DEP’T OF PSYCHIATRY, http://www.hms.harvard.
edu/psych/redbook/redbook-basicresearch-neuropharmacology-02.htm (last visited
June 11, 2011) (current research ongoing at Harvard); Roger D. Spealman & James K.
Rowlett, Nonhuman Primate Models of Addiction: Biological Basis and Experimental
Therapeutics, HARVARD DEP’T OF PSYCHIATRY, http://www.hms.harvard.edu/psych/
redbook/redbook-addictions-09.htm (last visited June 11, 2011) (current research ongo
ing at Harvard).
41. Britches’ Story, BRITCHES.ORG, http://www.britches.org.uk/story.asp (last vis
ited June 11, 2011). For example, Britches, a stump-tailed macaque monkey, was sepa
rated from his mother at birth to study maternal deprivation, and his eyelids were sewn
shut to study sensory deprivation and blindness. Id.; see also Britches, ANIMAL LIBERA
TION FRONT, http://www.animalliberationfront.com/ALFront/Actions-USA/Britches.
htm (last visited June 11, 2011); Britches’ Story, PETA, http://www.peta.org/tv/videos/
animal-experimentation/britches-story.aspx (last visited June 11, 2011). In 1985, when
Britches was five weeks old, the Animal Liberation Front (ALF), an animal rights
group, broke into the University of California, Riverside where Britches was confined
and released him. Britches’ Story, BRITCHES.ORG, supra; see also Britches, supra;
Britches’ Story, PETA, supra. ALF activists reported that they
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vel,42 radiation, and brain damage;43 toxicology;44 infectious disease;45 and age-related research.46 Such use in research has led to
the decline of the population of some species of primates.
One hundred years ago, an estimated five million chimpanzees
lived free in Africa.47 Today, however, chimpanzee “populations
have been decimated as humans have destroyed African tropical
forests, hunted . . . chimpanzees for food, and captured thousands
of chimpanzees for sale to American and European laboratories,
found Britches alone in a cage with bandages around his eyes and a sonar
device attached to his head that emitted a high-pitched screech every few min
utes. He was clinging to a device, covered in towelling [sic], that had two fake
nipples attached, apparently intended to serve as a surrogate mother.
Britches’ Story, BRITCHES.ORG, supra; see also Britches, supra; Britches’ Story, PETA,
supra.
42. See Tara Gray, A Brief History of Animals in Space, NASA HISTORY PRO
GRAM OFFICE (Aug. 2, 2004), http://history.nasa.gov/animals.html. In the 1950s, “[t]he
United States Air Force create[d] a breeding colony of 65 wild-caught chimpanzees for
use in the space program.” A History of Advocating for Chimpanzees Used in Research,
THE HUMANE SOC’Y OF THE U.S. (Sept. 29, 2010), http://www.humanesociety.org/
issues/chimpanzee_research/timelines/history.html. On January 31, 1961, Ham, a chim
panzee, “paved the way for the successful launch of America’s first human astronaut,
Alan B. Shepard, Jr.”; and on November 29, 1961, Enos, also a chimpanzee, paved the
way for astronaut John Glenn. Gray, supra; see also Chimpanzees: An Unnatural His
tory, Video: Chimps in the Space Program, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wnet/nature/
episodes/chimpanzees-an-unnatural-history/video-chimps-in-the-space-program/4468/
(last visited June 11, 2011); Project Mercury–Launching and Recovery of Mercury Cap
sule with the Chimpanzee Named Ham on Board, NASA IMAGES (Feb. 9, 1961), http://
www.nasaimages.org/luna/servlet/detail/nasaNAS~13~13~70215~175392:PROJECT
MERCURY—-LAUNCHING-AND-REC (last visited June 11, 2011). See generally
NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., RESULTS OF THE PROJECT MERCURY BALLIS
TIC AND ORBITAL CHIMPANZEE FLIGHTS (1963), http://history.nasa.gov/SP39
Chimpanzee.pdf (last visited June 11, 2011) (detailing the training and evaluation of the
chimpanzees used in the Mercury Chimpanzee Program). Most of the surviving chim
panzees used in the space program were later leased out by the Air Force for biomedi
cal research. New England Anti-Vivisection Soc’y, Air & Space, PROJECT R&R:
RELEASE & RESTITUTION FOR CHIMPANZEES IN U.S. LABORATORIES, http://www.
releasechimps.org/harm-suffering/research-history/air-space/ (last visited June 11,
2011).
43. See infra notes 138-139 and accompanying text.
44. See Chimpanzee Facts, THE CHIMPANZEE & HUMAN COMM’N INST., http://
www.cwu.edu/~cwuchci/faq.html (last visited June 11, 2011); Non-Human Primates
Used in Research, supra note 39.
45. See Chimpanzee Facts, supra note 44. For example, chimpanzees have been
used for hepatitis research, see supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (Booee and
Bruno at LEMPIS), and AIDS research, see Chimpanzee Facts, supra note 44; infra
notes 56-62 and accompanying text (Jerom).
46. See Non-Human Primates Used in Research, supra note 39.
47. RATTLING THE CAGE, supra note 7, at 6; Chimpanzee Facts, supra note 44
(“[C]himpanzees are indigenous only to Africa.”).
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circuses, and zoos.”48 As a result, chimpanzees are an endangered
species;49 their population has dwindled and it is “estimate[d] that
there are only 80,000 [to] 130,000 chimpanzees left in the entire
world.”50
“In the wild, chimpanzees live in very diverse social groups and
travel several miles in one day.”51 In contrast, in the laboratory,
they often “live alone in cold, metal cages approximately the size of
a closet.”52 Although they may see and hear other primates, they
may be denied their physical contact and companionship.53 Hous
ing chimpanzees alone “can cause severe problems such as depres
sion, heightened aggression, frustration and even self-mutilation.”54
Life in a laboratory is one of isolation, deprivation, boredom, fear,
and suffering.
Most chimpanzees in laboratories today are warehoused—con
fined, but not used in procedures.55 Many of the chimpanzees cur
rently warehoused —the surplus—were bred for AIDS research.56
Chimpanzees, however, do not develop the symptoms of AIDS af
ter being infected with HIV as humans do.57 Jerom was one of the
many lives wasted discovering this.58 Jerom was infected with three
strains of HIV before he was five years old; he was euthanized in
48. Chimpanzee Facts, supra note 44; see also RATTLING THE CAGE, supra note 7,
at 5-6.
49. See Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006). Wild chimpan
zees are listed as an “endangered” species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA);
whereas, captive chimpanzees are classified as a “threatened species.” Id. §§ 1532
1533. This classification protects chimpanzees born in the wild, but permits laboratory
research on chimpanzees bred in captivity.
50. Chimpanzee Facts, supra note 44.
51. Questions and Answers about Chimpanzees Used in Research, THE HUMANE
SOC’Y OF THE U.S. (Apr. 9, 2010), http://www.humanesociety.org/issues/chimpan
zee_research/qa/questions_answers.html [hereinafter Chimpanzees Used in Research].
52. Id.
53. FOUTS & MILLS, supra note 15, at 284.
54. Chimpanzees Used in Research, supra note 51; see also infra Part III.C (discussing inadequate environmental enhancements to promote the psychological well
being of rhesus monkeys).
55. Chimpanzees Used in Research, supra note 51.
56. Nancy R. Hoffman & Robun C. McGinnis, 2007-2008 Legislative Review, 15
ANIMAL L. 265, 269 (2009); New England Anti-Vivisection Soc’y, HIV/AIDS Debacle,
PROJECT R&R: RELEASE & RESTITUTION FOR CHIMPANZEES IN U.S. LABORATORIES,
http://www.releasechimps.org/harm-suffering/research-current/hivaids-debacle/ (last
visited June 11, 2011).
57. Hoffman & McGinnis, supra note 56, at 269-70; HIV/AIDS Debacle, supra
note 56.
58. See RATTLING THE CAGE, supra note 7, at 1-2; HIV/AIDS Debacle, supra
note 56.
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1996, just “shy of his fourteenth birthday.”59 He lived in “a large,
windowless, gray concrete box, one of eleven bleak steel-and-con
crete cells 9 feet by 11 feet by 8.5 feet” in the Chimpanzee Infec
tious Disease Building at the Yerkes Regional Primate Research
Center (Yerkes).60 Rachel Weiss, a former animal care technician
at Yerkes, cared for Jerom in the final six months of his life as an
“AIDS-like illness” ravaged his body.61 Weiss, reflecting on her
time with Jerom, stated,
As is often the case with experiments on live animals, Jerom suf
fered for much of his illness without being given medical treatment
to relieve his pain or misery, because doing so would have inter
fered with the course of the experiment . . . . Instead of a proud
figure, he was lean and gaunt, his hair dull, his skin pale, his eyes
sunken from wasting and bright with fear and fever. He suffered
in almost every way a caged chimpanzee can suffer, and then he
died.62

Some chimpanzees, however, have been spared the fate of
those in the laboratory. Washoe, for example, was the first chim
panzee to communicate with humans using American Sign Lan
guage (ASL).63 She was abducted from Africa as an infant and
brought to the United States for use in the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration’s (NASA) space chimpanzee program.64
Instead of being used in NASA’s program, Washoe was adopted
and raised by Allen and Beatrix Gardner in their home until she
was five years old, when she was relocated to a primate institute
that housed other chimpanzees.65 In 2007, at the approximate age
59. RATTLING THE CAGE, supra note 7, at 1; see also HIV/AIDS Debacle, supra
note 56.
60. RATTLING THE CAGE, supra note 7, at 2.
61. HIV/AIDS Debacle, supra note 56 (internal citations omitted). Jerom’s
“AIDS-like illness” was an exception to other HIV research done on chimpanzees; it
was the result of being infected with multiple HIV strains, which is not representative of
the infection and progression of the illness in humans. Id.
62. HIV/AIDS Debacle, supra note 56 (emphasis added); see also RATTLING THE
CAGE, supra note 7, at 1-2.
63. FOUTS & MILLS, supra note 15, at 4; Roger S. Fouts & Deborah H. Fouts,
Chimpanzees’ Use of Sign Language, in THE GREAT APE PROJECT 28-41 (Paola
Cavalieri & Peter Singer, eds. 1993), available at http://www.animal-rights-library.com/
texts-m/fouts01.pdf; Kolber, supra note 8, at 172. See generally FOUTS & MILLS, supra
note 15 (detailing the events of Washoe’s life); Meet Washoe, FRIENDS OF WASHOE,
http://www.friendsofwashoe.org/ (last visited June 11, 2011).
64. FOUTS & MILLS, supra note 15, at 4; Chimpanzee Facts, supra note 44; Meet
Washoe, supra note 63; see also Gray, supra note 42.
65. Fouts & Fouts, supra note 63; Kolber, supra note 8, at 172.
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of forty-two, Washoe died at a primate sanctuary after a short
illness.66
Washoe’s “accomplishments, along with those of her African
cousins, have served as a small flame in the dark halls of human
ignorance.”67 She and other chimpanzees have
demonstrate[d] that they have complex minds, are self-conscious
and self-aware, exhibit some or all of the elements of a theory of
mind (they know what other chimpanzees see or know what
other chimpanzees know), understand symbols, construct compli
cated societies, transmit culture, use a human language or sophis
ticated language-like communication system, and engage in such
complicated mental operations as deception, pretending, imita
tion, and insightful solving of difficult problems.68

Koko, a gorilla, was born in 1971 and learned sign-language
when she was one year old.69 She has a vocabulary of over 1,000
signs, and she understands approximately 2,000 English words.70
“Koko has a tested IQ of between 70 and 95 on a human scale,
where 100 is considered ‘normal.’”71 Beyond her intellectual abil
ity, Koko has demonstrated a range of emotional responses. Koko
had a pet cat she named “All Ball” who was hit by a car and
killed.72 She mourned when she was given the news.73 Dr.
Francine Patterson, recalling Koko’s reaction to All Ball’s death,
stated,
66. Meet the Family: Washoe’s Biography, FRIENDS OF WASHOE, http://www.
friendsofwashoe.org/washoe_bio.shtml (last visited June 11, 2011). The average lifes
pan of a chimpanzee is forty years; in captivity they can live up to sixty years, in the wild
fifty-three. Learn About Chimpanzees, FRIENDS OF WASHOE, http://www.friendsof
washoe.org/learn_about_chimpanzees.shtml (last visited June 11, 2011).
67. Fouts & Fouts, supra note 63, at 31.
68. The Legal Thinghood of Nonhuman Animals, supra note 7, at 227. In 2007, a
study conducted to measure short-term memory compared the ability of young chim
panzees and human adults: “the chimps won.” Malcolm Ritter, Young Chimp
Outscores College Students in Memory Test, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC NEWS, Dec. 3,
2007, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2007/12/071203-AP-chimp-memory.
html. “That challenges the belief of many people, including a number of scientists, that
‘humans are superior to chimpanzees in all cognitive functions’ . . . .” Id. (quoting
researcher Tetsuro Matsuzawa of Kyoto University).
69. The Gorilla Foundation, Koko’s World, KOKO.ORG, http://www.koko.org/
world/ (last visited June 11, 2011).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. FRANCINE PATTERSON, KOKO’S KITTEN (Scholastic, ed., 1985) (pages not
numbered); Kolber, supra note 8, at 172.
73. PATTERSON, supra note 72; Kolber, supra note 8, at 172.
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I told her that Ball had been hit by a car; she would not see him
again.
Koko did not respond. I thought she didn’t understand, so I
left the trailer.
Ten minutes later, I heard Koko cry. It was her distress
call—a loud, long series of high-pitched hoots . . . .
Three days later, Koko and I had a conversation about Ball.
“Do you want to talk about your kitty?” I asked.
“Cry,” Koko signed.
“Can you tell me more about it?” I asked.
“Blind,” she signed.
“We don’t see him anymore, do we? What happened to
your kitty?” I asked.
“Sleep cat,” Koko signed.
A few weeks later, Koko saw a picture of a gray tabby who
looked very much like Ball. She pointed to the picture and
signed, “Cry, sad, frown.”74

Koko also grieved after her companion of twenty-four years,
Michael, died.75 She “uttered frequent, mournful cries, particularly
at night.”76 And, in what appeared to be an effort to alleviate her
emotional distress, she requested, in sign language, a nightlight be
left on at night.77 The loss of her relationships with All Ball and
Michael had a significant emotional impact on Koko, which she
communicated to her human guardians.78
Rhesus monkeys, the most commonly used primate in labora
tory research in the United States, have also demonstrated their
capacity for complex learning and intelligence. In a recent study at
Yale School of Medicine, researchers played “rock, paper, scissors”
with rhesus monkeys, which demonstrates rhesus monkeys’ capacity
for disappointment and regret.79 “[E]ach time a monkey lost, it was
more likely in the next round to use the gesture that would have
won in the previous one ( . . . for instance, if the researcher’s rock
beat the monkey’s scissors, the monkey was more likely to throw a
rock in the next round).”80 According to researchers, this “suggests
74. PATTERSON, supra note 72.
75. Koko’s Mourning for Michael, supra note 8.
76. Kolber, supra note 8, at 174; Koko’s Mourning for Michael, supra note 8.
77. Kolber, supra note 8, at 174; Koko’s Mourning for Michael, supra note 8.
78. Koko’s Mourning for Michael, supra note 8.
79. Meredith Melnick, Monkeys, Like Humans, Make Bad Choices and Regret
Them, Too, TIME, May 31, 2011, http://healthland.time.com/2011/05/31/monkeys-play
rock-paper-scissors-and-show-regret-over-losing/.
80. Id.
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the monkeys were capable of analyzing past results and imagining a
different outcome.”81 In another recent study at Yerkes National
Primate Research Center rhesus monkeys demonstrated “that they
are able to recall things from recent memory.”82
Primates have repeatedly demonstrated that they are intelli
gent, emotional, social beings. Thus, they deserve legislative pro
tection that retires them from laboratories to sanctuaries where
they will be guaranteed a right to dignity and a life free from con
finement and torture in laboratories.
II. EVOLVING THEORY, PROTECTIVE LEGISLATION &
ACCESS TO THE COURTS
The animal welfare movement dates back to the late 1800s.83
Societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals were first estab
lished in the United States in the 1860s.84 In 1876, Britain passed
the first national law that regulated the use of animals in experi
mental research, the Cruelty to Animals Act of 1876.85 Although
the United States Congress conducted hearings on vivisection in
1900,86 federal legislation regulating the use of animals in laborato
ries was not passed until 1966.87 Despite gains in animal protection
generally and primate protection specifically, current legislation in
adequately protects the welfare of animals. Furthermore, enforce
ment of protective legislation is hindered by standing requirements.
And finally, a glance at the international community reveals that
the United States has been slow to enact legislation protecting pri
mates, specifically chimpanzees.
81. Id.
82. Michael Marshall & Aria Pearson, Monkeys Show Ability to Recall Patterns,
WASH. POST, May 9, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/science/monkeys
show-ability-to-remember-things/2011/05/05/AFq1BgdG_story.html.
83. UNTI, supra note 29, at 1.
84. Id. The Humane Society of the United States (HSUS), one of the largest
animal welfare organizations, was established in 1954. Id. at 3. “‘The Humane Society
of the United States opposes and seeks to prevent all use or exploitation of animals that
causes pain, suffering, or fear.’” Id. (quoting HSUS’s guiding policy). For history of
the HSUS, see id. at 2-40.
85. UNTI, supra note 29, at 66; see also FRANCIONE, supra note 7, at 190 (noting
that the “British legislation . . . tightly controlled [the] use of animals in painful
experiments”).
86. See Vivisection: Hearing on the Bill (S. 34) for the Further Prevention of Cru
elty to Animals in the District of Columbia Before the S. Comm. on the District of Co
lumbia, 56th Cong. (1900).
87. Laboratory Animal Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 89-544, 80 Stat. 350 (1966) (cur
rent version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (2006)).
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A. Evolving Theory: Animal Welfare Theory, Animal Rights
Theory, and Feminist Care Theory
The social movement to protect the welfare of and confer legal
rights on animals has grown in the last thirty-five years. This
growth has paralleled humans’ changing understanding of the inter
nal lives of animals, especially primates. Animal welfare and rights
are topics of social, political, and legal debate that have gained in
ternational attention.88 And animal law is a rapidly developing
area of legal academia and practice.89
In the animal law community, there is a divide between some
animal welfare theorists and some animal rights theorists. This is
not, however, a bright line divide, and some theorists take a middle
ground and recognize the value in advocating for both protective
legislation and legal rights. The welfare-rights debate centers
around whether animals should be better protected or granted legal
rights. Problematically, however, during this debate about whether
there should be bigger cages or no cages, animals remain confined
in cages.
Animal welfare theorists are concerned with enforcing and ex
panding current legislation and conservatively focus their attention
on preventing animal suffering. These reformist measures are criti
cized by some rights theorists as authorizing exploitation.90 Gary L.
Francione, animal rights legal scholar and professor of law, broadly
describes animal welfare as “the view that it is morally acceptable,
at least under some circumstances, to kill animals or subject them to
suffering as long as precautions are taken to ensure that the animal
is treated as ‘humanely’ as possible.”91 The Animal Welfare Act,92
for example, as will be discussed, authorizes exploitation because
under its provisions animals may be subjected to pain if scientifi
cally justified. Although animal welfare advocates’ methods may
be perceived as authorizing exploitation, their approach currently
may be the most practical way to address some of the suffering of
animals presently confined in cages. However, the inadequacies of
88. See, e.g., Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Moving Beyond Animal Rights: A Legal/Con
tractualist Critique, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 27, 29 (2009).
89. Id. “There are 131 law schools in the U.S. and Canada that have offered a
course in animal law.” Animal Law Courses, ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, http://
aldf.org/userdata_display.php?modin=51 (last visited June 11, 2011).
90. See, e.g., FRANCIONE, supra note 7, at 7.
91. Id. at 6.
92. Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159.
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current protective legislation, as will be discussed, illustrate the in
effectiveness of this approach.
Animal rights theorists, on the other hand, focus their atten
tion on granting animals legal rights such as legal standing93 and
legal personhood.94 “Rights theorists argue that . . . some animals
possess . . . some of the same rights enjoyed by humans . . . [that is,]
animals [do not] lose their rights whenever, or just because, humans
stand to benefit from exploiting animals.”95 Because animal rights
advocates strive for ending all exploitation of animals, they are
sometimes criticized as too radical.96 This criticism flows, in part,
from the reality that granting animals rights will require massive
economic and social restructuring because the food, clothing, en
tertainment, and biomedical research industries rely on the legal
exploitation of animals.97
An alternative to rights theory is feminist animal care theory.98
Feminist care theorists emphasize that empathy and compassion are
essential to deconstructing speciesist ideology.99 Feminist care the
orists also argue that it is important to consider animals not in rela
tion to their similarities or differences to human animals, but rather
to value them for themselves.100 Rights theorists, on the other
93. See infra Part II.C.3.
94. See infra Part II.C.2.
95. FRANCIONE, supra note 7, at 8. Steven M. Wise, animal rights attorney and
legal scholar, addresses the question of where to draw the line, suggesting a sort of
hierarchical structure. See generally STEVEN M. WISE, DRAWING THE LINE: SCIENCE
AND THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS (2002) (discussion includes great apes, dolphins,
elephants, and honeybees).
96. See Taimie L. Bryant, The Bob Barker Gifts to Support Animal Rights Law,
60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 237, 238 (2010) (“If ‘animal rights’ is understood as the position that
animals should have rights to prevent humans from exploiting them, the concept can be
considered ‘radical’ because animal exploitation is so deeply engrained in our
society.”).
97. FRANCIONE, supra note 7, at 253-54.
98. See, e.g., THE FEMINIST CARE TRADITION IN ANIMAL ETHICS, supra note 33.
99. See generally Josephine Donovan, Feminism and the Treatment of Animals:
From Care to Dialogue, 31 SIGNS 305 (2006). The lack of empathy that some humans
have for animals is arguably a learned behavior. Brian Luke, Taming Ourselves or Go
ing Feral? Toward a Nonpatriarchal Metaethic of Animal Liberation, in ANIMALS AND
WOMEN: FEMINIST THEORETICAL EXPLORATIONS 306 (Carol J. Adams & Josephine
Donovan eds., 1995) (“The ability to harm animals on a daily basis without overwhelm
ing distress requires an empathic curtailment which must be carefully inculcated.”); see
also Steven J. Bartlett, Roots of Human Resistance to Animal Rights: Psychological and
Conceptual Blocks, 8 ANIMAL L. 143, 154-55 (2002).
100. Linda Vance, Beyond Just-So Stories: Narrative, Animals, and Ethics, in ANI
MALS AND WOMEN: FEMINIST THEORETICAL EXPLORATIONS, supra note 99, at 185
(“The goal is not to make us care about animals because they are like us, but to care
about them because they are themselves.”).
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hand, have a tendency to focus on the similarities between, for ex
ample, nonhuman primates and human primates. This similarity is
a hook some rights theorists use to argue why primates should be
granted rights. Problematically, this similarity is also a hook that
advocates for animal research use.101
Welfare-based and rights-based theory are each valuable.
Strengthening and passing new protective legislation is important
because it addresses current suffering of animals. Attaining legal
rights for animals is essential for the larger, long-term goal of end
ing animal exploitation. In addition, care-based theory has valuable
insights that should not be rejected because it rests on an emo
tional, rather than a rational basis.
B. The Progression of Protective Legislation
1. Laboratory Animal Welfare Act
In the 1960s, animal welfare became a salient issue in the
United States when there was public outrage about the theft and
sale of companion animals for laboratory research.102 Life maga
zine’s 1966 photo-essay Concentration Camps for Dogs significantly
shaped public support of the issue of animal welfare.103 Photogra
pher Stan Wayman accompanied Frank McMahon, field director of
the Humane Society of the United States, and Maryland state po
lice as they raided dog dealer Lester Brown’s property.104 Wayman
captured horrific images of the neglectful and inhumane conditions
dogs were kept in before being sold to laboratories.105 Accounts of
the police raid describe horrendous conditions in which more than
one hundred dogs were suffering.106 Emaciated dogs were “dis
eased, numbed by the cold, chained to ramshackle boxes and bar
rels, jammed into chicken crates and wire pens, and wallowing in
their own wastes.”107 Some dogs were “too weak to crawl over to
the iced up cattle entrails strewn about the junkyard for them to
101. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
102. See, e.g., FRANCIONE, supra note 7, at 190.
103. Id.; UNTI, supra note 29, at 71; Wayman, supra note 29, at 23-29.
104. UNTI, supra note 29, at 71; Wayman, supra note 29, at 23-29.
105. UNTI, supra note 29, at 71; Wayman, supra note 29, at 23-29.
106. UNTI, supra note 29, at 71; Wayman, supra note 29, at 23-29.
107. Animal Abuse Case Details: Dog Found Frozen in Box on Property, PET
ABUSE.COM, http://www.pet-abuse.com/cases/9039/MD/US/ (last visited June 11, 2011).
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eat.”108 “Another dog lick[ed] desperately at a dish of water that
was frozen solid.”109 One “dog [was] frozen inside a box.”110
Public response to the mistreatment of these dogs was over
whelming, resulting in “more letters to Life than the magazine had
received on any other article, and . . . more letters to Congress than
were sent on issues such as civil rights and the war in Vietnam.”111
Six months after the publication of the Life magazine photo-essay,
a House Conference Report recognized that the “conscience and
concern” of “many thousands of Americans throughout the Na
tion”112 played a role in the enactment of the Laboratory Animal
Welfare Act (LAWA),113 now known as the Animal Welfare Act
(AWA),114 which President Lyndon Johnson signed into law.115
President Johnson stated at the signing:
science and research do not compel us to tolerate the kind of
inhumanity which has been involved in the business of supplying
stolen animals to laboratories or which is sometimes involved in
the careless and callous handling of animals in some of our labo
ratories. This bill will put an end to these abuses.116

Although the LAWA was the first federal law regulating any aspect
of the use of animals in research, it did not regulate the use of ani
mals during research.117 President Johnson’s statement at the sign
ing continued, “At the same time the bill does not authorize any
108. Id.; see also Wayman, supra note 29, at 23-29.
109. Wayman, supra note 29, at 27.
110. Id. at 26.
111. FRANCIONE, supra note 7, at 192. Congressional representatives received
more than 80,000 letters from Americans. UNTI, supra note 29, at 71.
112. H.R. REP. NO. 89-1848, at 6 (1966) (Conf. Rep.), available at http://www.
nal.usda.gov/awic/pubs/AWA2007/confrep_aug1966.pdf.
113. Laboratory Animal Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 89-544, 80 Stat. 350 (1966)
(current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (2006)).
114. Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159.
115. FRANCIONE, supra note 7, at 190; UNTI, supra note 29, at 71.
116. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks Upon Signing the Animal Welfare
Bill, (Aug. 24, 1966), THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=27796.
117. The LAWA required that the United States Department of Agriculture
establish and promulgate standards to govern the humane handling, care,
treatment, and transportation of animals by dealers and research facilities . . . .
The foregoing shall not be construed as authorizing the Secretary to prescribe
standards for the handling, care, or treatment of animals during actual re
search or experimentation by a research facility as determined by such re
search facility.
Laboratory Animal Welfare Act § 13, 80 Stat. at 352 (emphasis added); see also FRAN
CIONE, supra note 7, at 192.
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sort of interference with actual research or experimentation. They
just must go on.”118 This statement illustrates that the primary con
cern of this legislation was not animal welfare.
Rather than protecting animals, the purpose of the LAWA was,
in relevant part, “to protect the owners of dogs and cats from theft
of such pets, [and] to prevent the sale or use of dogs and cats which
have been stolen.”119 This stated purpose reflects a desire to pro
tect the property rights of owners of companion animals. Further
illustrating this, the LAWA required record keeping regarding “the
purchase, sale, transportation, identification, and previous owner
ship of dogs and cats, but not monkeys, guinea pigs, hamsters, or
rabbits.”120
2. Animal Welfare Act
In 1970, the LAWA was amended and renamed the Animal
Welfare Act (AWA),121 which is currently the primary federal legis
lation protecting animals.122 The purpose of the AWA is
(1) to insure that animals intended for use in research facilities or
for exhibition purposes or for use as pets are provided humane
care and treatment; (2) to assure the humane treatment of ani
mals during transportation in commerce; and (3) to protect the
owners of animals from the theft of their animals by preventing
the sale or use of animals which have been stolen.123

The 1970 amendment required, among other things, the use of an
esthetic, analgesic, or tranquillizing drugs during experimenta
tion.124
118. Johnson, supra note 116.
119. Laboratory Animal Welfare Act § 1, 80 Stat. at 350; see also S. REP. NO. 89
1281 (1966), available at http://www.animallaw.info/administrative/adussrep1281_1966.
htm.
120. Laboratory Animal Welfare Act § 10, 80 Stat. at 351.
121. Animal Welfare Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-579, 84 Stat. 1560 (current ver
sion at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (2006)). The 1970 amendment expanded the definition of
“animal.” Id. § 3(g), 84 Stat. at 1561. In 2002, the 1970 more inclusive definition was
amended and “animal” was redefined to exclude “birds, rats of the genus Rattus, and
mice of the genus Mus, bred for use in research.” Farm Security and Rural Investment
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, § 10301, 116 Stat. 134, 491 (current version at 7 U.S.C.
§ 2132(g)).
122. See Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2143. The Endangered Species Act is
another source of protection. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006); see supra note 49 (endangered versus threatened classifications).
123. Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2131.
124. Animal Welfare Act § 1, 84 Stat. at 1562. This amendment illuminates a
recognition of the painful and distressing nature of laboratory research.
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In 1976, the AWA was again amended,125 this time driven by
public concern regarding dog fighting126 and the inhumane treat
ment and death of animals during transportation due to improper
shipping containers, exposure to extreme temperatures, and lack of
ventilation and water.127 A cougar, for example, died several days
after being left in an
airless, coffin-like crate in a hot hangar for five hours on a day
when temperatures soared into the 90’s. The water pipe leading
into the crate was too narrow and rusty to be usable. The inside
of the crate was lined with wires, which the cougar tore and
twisted trying to get out, lacerating her paws in the struggle.128

Despite USDA resistance,129 the 1976 amendment brought trans
portation carriers130 and intermediate handlers131 of animals under
the provisions of the AWA. It established standards for “[shipping]
containers, feed, water, rest, ventilation, temperature, and han
dling” to promote better care for animals during transport.132 In
addition, it added a new provision that prohibits knowingly spon
soring, participating, transporting, or using the mail to promote
fighting of animals.133
125. Animal Welfare Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-279, 90 Stat. 417 (current ver
sion at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159).
126. In 2007, the AWA was again amended with animal fighting, specifically birds,
in mind. See Animal Fighting Prohibition Enforcement Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110
22, 121 Stat. 88.
127. Animal Welfare Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 417. “[Dogs’] crates are frequently
makeshift, poorly-ventilated and lacking in bedding and water containers. We have
seen them in airline warehouses, crying and whimpering with the need to relieve them
selves after having been cooped up for 24 hours or longer.” Animal Welfare Improve
ment Act of 1975: Hearing on S. 1941, S. 2070, S. 2430 Before the Subcomm. on the Env’t
of the Comm. of Commerce, 94th Cong. 57 (1975) (statement of Fay Brisk, Director of
Airport Activities, Washington Humane Society), available at http://lawlibrary.rutgers.
edu/gdoc/hearings/7/76601708/76601708_1.pdf.
128. Animal Welfare Improvement Act of 1975, supra note 127, at 59.
129. In 1975, the USDA, which is responsible for enforcing the AWA, opposed
amending the AWA to better protect animals in transit, but instead favored “voluntary
cooperation” with improved standards of care in transportation. Id. at 43 (statement of
Dr. Pierre A. Chaloux, Assistant Deputy Administrator, Veterinary Services, Animal
and Plant Health Inspection Service, Department of Agriculture). The USDA also op
posed amendments regarding animal fighting because it believed that this was the re
sponsibility of the state and local law enforcement agencies and because it lacked “the
kind of trained manpower and other resources necessary to prohibit animal fights or
arrest the involved persons.” Id. at 45.
130. Animal Welfare Act of 1976, 90 Stat. at 418 (current version at 7 U.S.C.
§ 2132(2)(j) (2008)).
131. Id.
132. Id. § 9, 90 Stat. at 419.
133. Id. § 17, 90 Stat. at 421.
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Public outrage, in response to two highly publicized cases of
horrific mistreatment of primates in laboratory research, led to
Congress again amending the AWA with the passage of the Food
Security Act of 1985.134 In 1983, the Silver Spring Monkey case
revealed severe mistreatment of monkeys.135 Alex Pacheco, co
founder of People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA),
documented numerous violations of the AWA while volunteering at
the Institute for Biological Research in Silver Spring, Maryland,
leading to the seizure of seventeen monkeys.136 The Silver Spring
Monkeys were not provided “sufficient food or water, a sanitary
environment, or adequate veterinary care.”137 And in 1984, the
Animal Liberation Front, an animal rights group, released video
tapes that revealed “severe mistreatment of baboons by govern
ment-funded researchers” at the Head Injury Clinic at the

134. Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, §§ 1751-1759, 99 Stat. 1354,
1645-50. This amendment introduced exercise requirements for dogs in research facili
ties, and a requirement for “a physical environment adequate to promote the psycho
logical well-being of primates.” Id. § 1752, 99 Stat. at 1650.
135. Taub v. State, 463 A.2d 819 (Md. 1983); see also Int’l Primate Prot. League v.
Inst. for Behavioral Research, Inc., 799 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1986); infra notes 245-250 and
accompanying text.
Twelve of the seventeen monkeys had disabled limbs as a result of surgical
interference (deafferentation) when they were juveniles . . . .
No one bothered to bandage the monkeys’ injuries properly (on the few
occasions when bandages were used at all), and antibiotics were administered
only once; no lacerations of self-amputation injuries were ever cleaned. . . .
The monkeys also suffered from a variety of wounds that were self-inflicted or
inflicted by monkeys grabbing at them from adjoining cages. I saw dis
coloured, exposed muscle tissue on their arms. Two monkeys had bones pro
truding through their flesh. Several had bitten off their own fingers and had
festering stubs . . . .
Alex Pacheco & Anna Francione, The Silver Spring Monkeys, in IN DEFENSE OF ANI
MALS 136-37 (Peter Singer ed., 1985).
136. See generally Pacheco & Francione, supra note 135, at 136-46.
137. Int’l Primate Prot. League, 799 F.2d at 936. “In addition to the tiny, filthy
cages, Pacheco noted that no one properly bandaged the monkeys limbs, that the
monkeys went for many days without being fed, that no one cleaned the cages and lab
rooms regularly, and that Taub never used a [veterinarian].” Marci Messet, They Asked
for Protection and They Got Policy: International Primate’s Mutilated Monkeys, 21 AK
RON L. REV. 97, 101 n.51 (1987) (citing Pacheco & Francione, supra note 135, at 13641). “When the police went into his laboratory, they discovered monkeys with open
wounds from self-amputation and a disturbing lack of hygiene, including cages ‘caked
with feces.’” Id. at 101 n.51 (quoting Karen L. McDonald, Comment, Creating a Pri
vate Cause of Action Against Abusive Animal Research, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 406
(1986) (footnotes omitted)).
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University of Pennsylvania.138 “The tapes showed governmentfunded experiments in which baboons were knocked repeatedly on
their heads without first being properly anesthetized. Other scenes
recorded the primates coming out of anesthesia before doctors had
finished operating on their brains. The tapes were viewed by mil
lions of television viewers across the country.”139
In 1990, another amendment to the AWA was motivated by the
issue of stolen pets and focused on the use of ex-pets in laborato
ries.140 This amendment requires shelters to hold all dogs and cats
for at least five days, allowing time for pet owners to claim their
pets or for adoption to new homes.141 In some states, after this fiveday window, ex-pets may be sold to research facilities and laborato
ries.142 This shift from pet to laboratory subject illuminates ani
mals’ status as things, as property.
138. Colette L. Adkins Giese, Twenty Years Wasted: Inadequate USDA Regula
tions Fail to Protect Primate Psychological Well-Being, 1 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 221,
224-25 (2006).
139. Joseph Mendelson, III, Should Animals Have Standing? A Review of Stand
ing Under the Animal Welfare Act, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 795, 799 & n.38 (1997)
(citing David Masci, Fighting Over Animal Rights: Has Public Support for the Move
ment Peaked?, CQ RESEARCHER, Aug. 2, 1996, at 673-96); see also Unnecessary Fuss,
PETA, http://www.peta.org/tv/videos/animal-experimentation/803731940001.aspx (last
visited June 11, 2011) (video of brain damage experiments by government funded re
searchers at the University of Pennsylvania).
140. Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101
624, § 2503, 104 Stat. 3359, 4066 (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 2158 (2006)).
141. Id.
142. Under Michigan law, for example,
Dogs and cats shall not be offered for sale or sold to a research facility at
public auction or by weight; or purchased by a research facility at public auc
tion or by weight. A research facility shall not purchase any dogs or cats ex
cept from a licensed dealer, public dog pound, humane society, or from a
person who breeds or raises dogs or cats for sale. Any county, city, village or
township operating a dog pound or animal shelter may sell for an amount not
to exceed $10.00 per animal or otherwise dispose of unclaimed or unwanted
dogs and cats to a Michigan research facility.
MICH COMP. LAWS ANN. § 287.389 (West 2010) (emphasis added); see also Youngblood
v. Jackson Cnty., 184 N.W.2d 290, 291 (Mich. Ct. App. (1970) (holding that “[i]f Jackson
County has authority to operate a dog pound . . . [it is] authori[zed to sell] . . . im
pounded and unlicensed dogs to the University of Michigan”). Under Massachusetts
law, however, “no person, institution, animal dealer or their authorized agents shall
transport, or cause to be transported, any animal obtained from any municipal or public
pound, public agency, or dog officer acting individually or in an official capacity into the
commonwealth for purposes of research, experimentation, testing, instruction or dem
onstration.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 174D (2008). In 2009, the USDA reported
that there were 20,160 cats and 67,337 dogs used in laboratory research. PAIN TYPE:
TOTAL 2009, supra note 2, at 2. Of those, 180 cats and 782 dogs were used in painful
procedures, but their pain was not alleviated because pain relieving drugs would have

R

\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-3\WNE305.txt

2011]

unknown

Seq: 23

CULTIVATING COMPASSIONATE LAW

29-SEP-11

13:43

877

The USDA is responsible for enforcing the AWA and promul
gating regulations.143 The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Ser
vice (APHIS), an agency within the USDA, is responsible for
administration through its Animal Care (AC) program.144 Under
the AWA, the Secretary of Agriculture has a duty to “promulgate
standards to govern the humane handling, care, treatment, and
transportation of animals by . . . research facilities,”145 including
minimum standards “for handling, housing, feeding, watering, sani
tation, ventilation, shelter from extremes of weather and tempera
tures, adequate veterinary care, and separation by species,”146 “and
for a physical environment adequate to promote the psychological
well-being of primates.”147 These standards of humane care and
treatment are contained in Title 9 of the Code of Federal Regula
tions.148 The Secretary, however, does not have authority “to pro
mulgate rules, regulations, or orders with regard to the design,
outlines, or guidelines of actual research or experimentation by a
research facility as determined by such research facility.”149
To ensure compliance, the AWA requires that private research
facilities be licensed by150 or registered with the Secretary of
Agriculture.151 Each non-federal research facility that uses
animals must be inspected once a year.152 APHIS has approxi
interfered with or compromised the research. PAIN TYPE: WITH PAIN, NO DRUGS 2009,
supra note 2, at 2.
143. APHIS ANIMAL CARE, THE ANIMAL CARE PROGRAM AND THE U.S. DE
PARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE’S AUTHORITY UNDER THE ANIMAL WELFARE ACT: BA
SIC QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (2005), http://www.aphis.usda.gov/publications/animal_
welfare/content/printable_version/faq_awa.pdf.
144. Id.
145. Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(1) (2006).
146. Id. § 2143(a)(2).
147. Id. § 2143(a)(2)(B).
148. 9 C.F.R. §§ 1.1 -3.142 (2010).
149. Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(6)(A)(i).
150. Id. § 2133.
151. Id. § 2136.
152. Id. § 2146(a); ANIMAL CARE ANNUAL REPORT OF ACTIVITIES: FISCAL
YEAR 2007, at 11 (2008) [hereinafter ANIMAL CARE ANNUAL REPORT OF ACTIVITIES],
available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/publications/animal_welfare/content/printable_
version/2007_AC_Report.pdf. Federal facilities are not required to register with
APHIS and they are not inspected to ensure compliance; however, they must comply
with the AWA’s regulations. Id. Federal research facilities must establish a Federal
[Institutional Animal Care and Use] Committee that has the same composition and
responsibilities required of nonfederal research facilities. 7 U.S.C. § 2143(c); see also 9
C.F.R. § 2.37. Instead of reporting deficiencies to APHIS, the Federal Committee re
ports to the head of the federal agency conducting the research. 7 U.S.C. § 2143(c); see
also 9 C.F.R. § 2.37. The head of the federal agency is “responsible for (1) all corrective
action to be taken at the facility; and (2) the granting of all exceptions to inspection
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mately 100 AC inspectors who document compliance of stand
ards.153
According to the USDA, approximately 20,000 violations of
the AWA occurred every year between October 1, 2003 and Sep
tember 30, 2006, affecting over two million animals.154 Reports
from October 1, 2005 to September 30, 2006 documented 20,281
violations affecting 453,194 animals.155 A similar report from 2004
to 2005 documented 20,845 violations affecting 1,364,358 animals.156
From 2003 to 2004, there were 18,275 violations affecting 382,823
animals.157 Over this three-year period, the number of reported
AWA violations per year remained fairly constant, thus suggesting
that the current system of sanction is an ineffective deterrent.
3. Legislation Protecting Great Apes
An August 2005 poll revealed that “[n]early twice as many
Americans support a ban on chimpanzee research as do those who
oppose such a ban.”158 The retirement of “chimpanzees used in re
search for more than 10 years” is supported by 71 percent of Amer
icans.159 The United States, however, has not been at the forefront
of the international movement to protect primates; whereas, there
are bans or limits on chimpanzee research in many other coun
protocol.” 7 U.S.C. § 2143(c); see also 9 C.F.R. § 2.37. All registered and federal re
search facilities must also submit a report of their activities involving the number of
animals used, their species, and the number of procedures that were or were not pain
ful, and whether pain-relieving drugs were administered during painful procedures.
ANIMAL CARE ANNUAL REPORT OF ACTIVITIES, supra, at 12.
153. ANIMAL CARE ANNUAL REPORT OF ACTIVITIES, supra note 152, at 8.
154. USDA, VIOLATION SUMMARY OCT. 1, 2005 TO SEPT. 30, 2006, at 22 (2007)
[hereinafter VIOLATIONS 05-06], available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_welfare/
downloads/violations/2006violations.pdf; USDA, VIOLATION SUMMARY OCT. 1, 2004
TO SEPT. 30, 2005, at 24 (2005) [hereinafter VIOLATIONS 04-05], available at http://www.
aphis.usda.gov/animal_welfare/downloads/violations/2005violations.pdf; USDA, VIO
LATION SUMMARY OCT. 1, 2003 TO SEPT. 30, 2004, at 22 (2005) [hereinafter VIOLA
TIONS
03-04], available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_welfare/downloads/
violations/2004violations.pdf. These summaries include all violations of the AWA, not
only the violations within the laboratory context.
155. VIOLATIONS 05-06, supra note 154, at 22.
156. VIOLATIONS 04-05, supra note 154, at 24.
157. VIOLATIONS 05-06, supra note 154, at 22.
158. New England Anti-Vivisection Society, Public Opinion, PROJECT R&R: RE
LEASE & RESTITUTION FOR CHIMPANZEES IN U.S. LABORATORIES, http://www.
releasechimps.org/mission/end-chimpanzee-research/public-opinion (last visited June
11, 2011).
159. Id.
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tries.160 The United Kingdom, for example, banned licenses for
chimpanzee research in 1997.161 In 2000, New Zealand was the first
nation to ban chimpanzee research.162 The Netherlands followed in
2002, Sweden in 2003, Austria in 2006, and Belgium in 2008.163
Australia issued a policy statement limiting chimpanzee research in
2003.164 Japan put a strong moratorium on chimpanzee research in
2006.165
In the United States, Congress first passed legislation specifi
cally regarding primate research in 2000.166 The Chimpanzee
Health Improvement, Maintenance, and Protection Act (CHIMP
Act) provides a national sanctuary system “for the lifetime care of
[surplus] chimpanzees that have been used, or were bred or pur
chased for use, in research conducted or supported by . . . agen
cies of the Federal Government.”167 When the CHIMP Act
was first enacted, however, there was a provision that allowed for
the temporary removal of retired chimpanzees from the sanctu
ary for medical research.168 The CHIMP Act was amended in
160. New England Anti-Vivisection Society, International Bans, PROJECT R&R:
RELEASE & RESTITUTION FOR CHIMPANZEES IN U.S. LABORATORIES, http://www.
releasechimps.org/mission/end-chimpanzee-research/country-bans (last visited June 11,
2011).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Chimpanzee Health Improvement, Maintenance, and Protection Act of
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-551, 114 Stat. 2752 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 287a-3a(a)
(2006)).
167. Chimpanzee Health Improvement, Maintenance, and Protection Act, 42
U.S.C. § 287a-3a(a).
168. Id. § 287a-3a(d)(3)(A)(ii)(I) - (IV).
The chimpanzee may be used in research if – (I) the Secretary finds that there
are special circumstances in which there is need for that individual, specific
chimpanzee (based on that chimpanzee’s prior medical history, prior research
protocols, and current status), and there is no chimpanzee with a similar his
tory and current status that is reasonably available among chimpanzees that
are not in the sanctuary system; (II) the Secretary finds that there are techno
logical or medical advancements that were not available at the time the chim
panzee entered the sanctuary system, and that such advancements can and will
be used in the research; (III) the Secretary finds that the research is essential
to address an important public health need; (IV) and the design of the re
search involves minimal pain and physical harm to the chimpanzee, and other
wise minimizes mental harm, distress, and disturbance to the chimpanzee and
the social group in which the chimpanzee lives (including with respect to re
moval of the chimpanzee from the sanctuary facility involved).
Id.
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2007 and now prohibits the return of retired chimpanzees to
research.169
There has also been proposed legislation, namely the Great
Ape Protection Act (GAPA),170 which aims to end all invasive re
search171 on great apes.172 But this legislation would only begin to
put an end to experimentation on primates. Chimpanzees are the
only great apes currently used in laboratory research in the United
States.173 There are approximately 1,000 to 1,200 chimpanzees in
nine research facilities in the United States, approximately half of
these research facilities are owned by the United States.174 How
ever, currently “[t]here are more than 112,000 nonhuman primates
169. 42 U.S.C. § 287a-3a (amended 2007).
[A] chimpanzee accepted into the sanctuary system may not be used for stud
ies or research, except . . . [that] [t]he chimpanzee may be used for noninvasive
behavioral studies or medical studies based on information collected during
the course of normal veterinary care that is provided for the benefit of the
chimpanzee, provided that any such study involves minimal physical and
mental harm, pain, distress, and disturbance to the chimpanzee and the social
group in which the chimpanzee lives.
Id. § 287a-3a(d)(3)(A).
170. Great Ape Protection Act, S. 3694, 111th Cong. (2010); Great Ape Protec
tion Act, H.R. 1326, 111th Cong. (2009). The Great Ape Protection Act was originally
introduced on April 17, 2008. H.R. Rep. No. 5852, 110th Cong. (2008). On March 5,
2009, the Great Ape Protection Act was reintroduced in the House and on August 3,
2010 in the Senate. H.R. 1326; S. 3694.
171. Congress defines “invasive research” as
any research that may cause death, bodily injury, pain, distress, fear, injury, or
trauma to a great ape, including – (i) the testing of any drug or intentional
exposure to a substance that may be detrimental to the health or psychological
well-being of a great ape; (ii) research that involves penetrating or cutting the
body or removing body parts, restraining, tranquilizing, or anesthetizing a
great ape; or (iii) isolation, social deprivation, or other experimental physical
manipulations that may be detrimental to the health or psychological well
being of a great ape.
H.R. 1326. In contrast, noninvasive research is, for example, observing primates’ social
behavior in a sanctuary.
172. “Great apes” include chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas, orangutans, and gib
bons. Id.
173. Latest HSUS Undercover Investigation Reveals Abuse of Chimps, Other Pri
mates in Federally Funded Research Laboratory, THE HUMANE SOC’Y OF THE U.S.
(Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.humanesociety.org/news/press_releases/2009/03/
investigation_chimps_sm_030409.html [hereinafter Investigation Reveals Abuse of
Chimps]; see also New England Anti-Vivisection Society, Research Labs with Chimpan
zees, PROJECT R&R: RELEASE & RESTITUTION FOR CHIMPANZEES IN U.S. LABORATO
RIES, http://www.releasechimps.org/labs/labs-with-chimpanzees (last visited June 11,
2011).
174. Investigation Reveals Abuse of Chimps, supra note 173; see also Research
Labs with Chimpanzees, supra note 173.
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being kept in more than 200 U.S. laboratories.”175 Therefore, prob
lematically, the GAPA would leave over 100,000 primates confined
in laboratories and subject to continued research.176
C. Access to the Courts: Legal Thinghood, Personhood, and
Standing
1. Nonhuman Animals as Property
The law generally recognizes two categories: property and per
sons.177 Property is defined as “[t]he right to possess, use, and en
joy a determinate thing.”178 A thing is “[t]he subject matter of a
right.”179 The legal status of nonhuman animals is “legal
thinghood.”180 There is historical181 and legal precedent182 support
ing the property status of animals.183
Social contract theorist John Locke argued that when humans
improve nature through their labor they translate it into prop
175. Investigation Reveals Abuse of Chimps, supra note 173.
176. Great Apes receive much public attention and it is likely that many people
view legislation such as the GAPA as adequately protecting the entire primate commu
nity. Therefore, there needs to be more public awareness about the primate population
that will be unaffected by this proposed legislation.
177. This is problematic because “[a]nimals are not humans and [they] are not
inanimate objects.” Bartlett, supra note 99, at 148 (citation omitted).
178. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 38, at 1335 (emphasis added).
179. Id. at 1617.
180. RATTLING THE CAGE, supra note 7, at 4; see also FRANCIONE, supra note 7,
at 166. See generally The Legal Thinghood of Animals, supra note 7, at 472.
181. RATTLING THE CAGE, supra note 7, at 10-22. “[H]istorical precedent has
supported . . . [opponents of animal rights] unquestioned commitment to human domi
nance and the exploitative use of nonhuman animals as chattel.” Bartlett, supra note
99, at 152.
182. See, e.g., State v. Mata, 668 N.W. 2d 448, 469 (Neb. 2003) (noting that “pri
vately owned animals are ‘effects’ subject to the protections of the Fourth Amend
ment”); Fackler v. Genetzky, 595 N.W. 2d 884, 891 (Neb. 1999) (“[T]he general rule is
that an animal . . . is personal property.”); Campbell v. District of Columbia, 19 App.
D.C. 131 (1901) (“The owner of an animal dying within the city limits, is entitled to a
reasonable opportunity to exercise his unextinguished right of property in the carcass
. . . .”).
183. There are two basic arguments supporting the property status of animals.
The first is that humans are morally superior. The second argument is theological.
FRANCIONE, supra note 7, at 36; Bartlett, supra note 99, at 149. “In the Book of Genesis, God gives man dominion over animals. We are the sovereign authority. We decide
if and how they live, where and when they die.” Improved Standards for Lab. Animals
Act; and Enforcement of the Animal Welfare Act by the Animal and Plant Health Inspec
tion Serv.: Hearing on H.R. 5725 Before the Subcomm. on Dep’t Operations, Research
and Foreign Agric. of the H. Comm. on Agric., 98th Cong. 103 (1984) (statement of
Donald McCaig, sheep farmer supporting the Improved Standards for Laboratory Ani
mals Act).
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erty.184 Capturing a wild animal is an example Locke used to illus
trate his theory:
And even amongst us the Hare that any one is Hunting, is
thought his who purses her during the Chase. For being a Beast
that is still looked upon as common, and no Man’s private Pos
session; whoever has imploy’d so much labour about any of that
kind, as to find and pursue her, has thereby removed her from
the state of Nature, wherein she was common, and hath begun a
Property.185

Similarly, the law recognizes a property right in an animal that has
been removed from its natural habitat.186 Under this reasoning,
humans are entitled to ownership of animals over which they have
dominion and control. “Humans are entitled under the laws of
property to convey or sell their animals, consume or kill them, use
them as collateral, obtain their natural dividends, and exclude
others from interfering with an owner’s exercise of dominion and
control over them.”187
There is a link between the property status of animals and the
“presumed moral superiority and entitlement of humans.”188
Humans have created a belief system that animals exist for human
use.189 The law is rooted in this belief.190 Changing this ideology
184. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 290 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge University Press 2003) (1690).
185. Id.
186. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (stating that wild animals that
have been “wounded, circumvented or ensnared” are deprived of their natural liberty
and thus subject to the control of the human who pursued them); see also Geer v.
Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 523 (1896), overruled by Hughes v. Okla., 441 U.S. 322
(1979) (“[A]ll the animals which can be taken upon the earth, in the sea, or in the air,—
that is to say, wild animals,—belong to those who take them . . . because that which
belong to nobody is acquired by the natural law by the person who first possesses it.”).
Historically, the law similarly recognized that a married woman was the property of her
husband. See infra note 231 and accompanying text.
187. FRANCIONE, supra note 7, at 24.
188. Taimie L. Bryant, Sacrificing the Sacrifice of Animals: Legal Personhood for
Animals, the Status of Animals as Property, and the Presumed Primacy of Humans, 39
RUTGERS L.J. 247, 328 (2008).
189. RATTLING THE CAGE, supra note 7, at 10. Based on these belief systems,
humans consume animals in a variety of ways: for food, clothing, and entertainment,
and in the form of the benefits of biomedical research such as pharmaceuticals.
190. Id. The AWA regulates human use of animals. See supra note 6 and note 123
and accompanying next. One of the stated purposes of the AWA is “to ensure that
animals intended for use in research facilities or for exhibition purposes or for use as pets
are provided humane care and treatment.” Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2131 (2006)
(emphasis added). The AWA also explicitly excludes from protection under its provi
sions farm animals “used or intended for use as food.” Animal Welfare Act, § 2132(g).

R
R

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-3\WNE305.txt

2011]

unknown

Seq: 29

CULTIVATING COMPASSIONATE LAW

29-SEP-11

13:43

883

will require massive economic and social restructuring because the
food, clothing, entertainment, and biomedical research industries
are dependent on the legal exploitation of animals.191 Taimie Bry
ant argues that “[s]haring legal space in our laws and in our courts
seems unlikely as long as humans consider themselves morally su
perior to animals and reinforce that conception by treating animals
as their property.”192 Women were also historically denied the right
to share legal space in our laws,193 and this concept was reinforced
by treating women as their husband’s property.
As an illustration of the property status of primates, there were
tax consequences when Fouts purchased an infant chimpanzee from
a research facility. Washoe, the chimpanzee saved from the space
program,194 suffered grief after losing a baby.195 To ease Washoe’s
grief, Fouts found “a baby for Washoe to adopt.”196 Fouts pur
chased Loulis for ten thousand dollars plus 7.5 percent sales tax.197
2. Legal Personhood
Legal personhood is important because it “establishes one’s le
gal right to be ‘recognized as a potential bearer of legal rights.’”198
A common understanding of the word “person” is “human.”199 In
contrast, “animal” is defined as “[a]ny living creature other than a
human being.”200 But legal personhood is not about humanness.201
As Congress understands it, “In determining the meaning of any
191. FRANCIONE, supra note 7, at 253-54.
192. Bryant, supra note 188, at 330.
193. See infra Part III.A.
194. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
195. FOUTS & MILLS, supra note 15, at 234.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 237, 343.
198. RATTLING THE CAGE, supra note 7, at 4 (quoting Michael Bogan, Article 6,
in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY 111 (Asbjorn
Eide, et al. eds., 1992)).
199. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S, supra note 12, at 924; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 38, at 1257.
200. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 38, at 102.
201. Corporations and ships, for example, are legal persons. Fisher, supra note 5,
at 439. In the late 1800s,
the Supreme Court began finding corporations to be “persons” for some pur
poses under the Constitution, and in the 1900s, the Court began applying some
but not all of the Bill of Rights’ protections to corporations. Presently, corpo
rations enjoy Fifth Amendment due process protections, along with “first
amendment guarantees of political speech, commercial speech, and negative
free speech rights; fourth amendment safeguards against unreasonable regula
tory search; fifth amendment double jeopardy and liberty rights; and sixth and
seventh amendments entitlements to trial by jury.”
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Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise . . . the
word[ ] ‘person’ . . . include[s] corporations, companies, associa
tions, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as
well as individuals.”202 “Personhood is an important idea in the
law, and . . . the manner in which a statutory scheme defines ‘per
son’ substantially impacts the interpretation and application of that
scheme.”203 Legal personhood is a legal construction that estab
lishes access to the courts, and without it, one lacks legal standing.
3. Nonhuman Primates and Legal Standing
Legal standing is one of the biggest threshold obstacles for
animal activists. Francione states, “Standing is a prerequisite—per
haps the most important prerequisite—for the enforcement of
rights.”204 There is constitutional standing,205 which requires a
plaintiff to show injury in fact, causation, and redressability; and
prudential standing.206 The latter requires, in the absence of an ex
press citizen suit provision, a plaintiff to show her injury is within
the zone of interests that Congress arguably intended to protect
under the relevant statute, meaning she must assert her own rights
and not those of a third party.207 Because the legal status of ani
mals is legal thinghood, animals have no legal standing. Standing to
challenge their treatment must come through humans.
In this respect, the Animal Welfare Act (AWA)208 is ineffective
because animal welfare advocates and organizations have difficulty
litigating under the statute because they often lack standing.209 The
Fourth Circuit stated, “The statutory design [of the AWA] is . . .
Cupp, supra note 88, at 52-53 (quoting Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal:
Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 577 (1990)); see also Sierra Club
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 742 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Inanimate objects are
sometimes parties in litigation.”); Tucker v. Alexanderoff, 183 U.S. 424, 438 (1902) (“A
ship is born when she is launched . . . . She acquires a personality of her own . . . .”);
Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886) (finding corporations are per
sons under the Fourteenth Amendment).
202. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
203. Michael J. Gerardi, Note, The “Person” at Federal Law: A Framework and a
Rico Test Suite, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2239, 2267 (2009).
204. FRANCIONE, supra note 7, at 67.
205. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
206. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Am. United for Separation Church and State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982).
207. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
208. Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (2006).
209. See, e.g., Int’l Primate Prot. League v. Inst. for Behavioral Research, Inc.,
799 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1986).
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inconsistent with [a] private right of action . . . . The Act . . . does
not imply any provision for lawsuits by private individuals as a com
plement to the authority of the Secretary of Agriculture.”210 Thus,
an animal lacks the capacity to sue, and therefore cannot assert that
there has been a violation of her rights, nor can anyone sue on her
behalf.211 As Congressman Rose aptly stated while introducing a
bill to amend the AWA to include a citizen suit provision, “if the
animals can’t sue on their own behalf, and if people can’t sue on
their behalf, who can?”212
Cases brought under the Endangered Species Act (ESA)213 do
not always face the same difficulty as the AWA because there is a
citizen suit provision, which allows a private individual standing to
sue.214 The ESA, however, does not provide a remedy for chimpan
zees bred in captivity and used in laboratory research because they
are classified as a “threatened species,” rather than an “endangered
species.”215
Although the Ninth Circuit dismissed a case brought under en
vironmental laws for lack of standing, the court suggested its will
ingness to accept species standing if Congress modified the
language of the statutes:
[W]e see no reason why Article III prevents Congress from au
thorizing a suit in the name of an animal, any more than it pre
vents suits brought in the name of artificial persons such as
corporations, partnerships or trusts, and even ships, or of juridiThe [Animal Welfare] Act seeks to insure that “animals intended for use in
research facilities . . . are provided humane care and treatment.” . . . There is
no indication, however, that Congress intended this goal to come at the ex
pense of progress in medical research. To the contrary, both the language of
the statute and the means chosen by Congress to enforce it preserve the hope
that responsible primate research hold for the treatment and cure of human
kind’s most terrible afflictions. The statutory design is, in turn, inconsistent
with the private right of action that plaintiff’s assert.
Id. at 939 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2131(1)); see also Rob Roy Smith, Note, Standing on
Their Own Four Legs: The Future of Animal Welfare Litigation After Animal Legal
Def. Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 29 ENVTL. L. 989, 992 (1999).
210. Int’l Primate Prot. League, 799 F.2d at 939-40.
211. Deawn A. Hersini, Comment, Can’t Get There From Here . . . Without Sub
stantive Revision: The Case for Amending the Animal Welfare Act, 70 UMKC L. REV.
145, 150 (2001).
212. 135 CONG. REC. H1932 (May 16, 1989) (statement of Rep. Rose).
213. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006).
214. Id. § 1540(g).
215. 16 U.S.C. § 1533; 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (2010); Investigation Reveals Abuse of
Chimps, supra note 173; Chimpanzee Facts, supra note 44.
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cally incompetent persons such as infants, juveniles and mental
incompetents.216

This case illustrates a willingness of the judiciary to extend standing
to animals, but deference to the legislature to act.
In 2005, a groundbreaking case in Brazil granted a chimpanzee
access to the court.217 A writ of habeas corpus was filed on behalf
of Suı́ça, a chimpanzee who lived in the city zoo in Salvador,
Bahia.218
[T]he petitioner, member of the chimpanzee species, is impris
oned at Salvador Zoo in a[n] unsuitable enclosure (total area of
77.56 m2, height 4.0 m, and confined area of 2.75 m), being hin
dered of her right of movement . . . . The lack of space, the bare
cement floor, and the solitary confinement was causing great suf
fering to Suı́ça.219

The relief sought was Suı́ça’s release from solitary confinement and
transfer to a primate sanctuary.220 Unfortunately, Suı́ça died and
the motion was dismissed.221 This case is significant, however, be
cause this was the first time a court recognized a nonhuman primate
as a plaintiff.222 Acknowledging that Suı́ça’s case involved a com
plex and controversial issue, Judge Edmundo Lucio da Cruz stated
in his opinion,
I am sure that with the acceptance of the debate, I caught the
attention of jurists from all over the country, bringing the matter
to discussion. Criminal Procedural Law is not static, rather sub
ject to constant changes, and new decisions have to adapt to new
times. I believe that even with “Suı́ça’s” death the matter will

216. Cetcean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1176 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that
plaintiff, as representative for all whales, porpoises, and dolphins, lacked standing
under environmental laws to challenge the Navy’s use of sonar).
217. See Tribunal do Juri
´ de Salvador [Jury Court of Salvador], No.833085-3/2005,
In re Suı́ça, Correio da Bahia, 19.9.2005 (Brazil), English translation available at http://
www.animallaw.info/nonus/cases/cabrsuicaeng2005.htm, Portuguese decision available
at http://www.animallaw.info/nonus/cases/cabrsuicapt2005.htm; Clayton, supra note 36.
218. In re Suı́ça, No. 833085-3/2005; Clayton, supra note 36.
219. Clayton, supra note 36.
220. In re Suı́ça, No. 833085-3/2005; Clayton, supra note 36.
221. In re Suı́ça, No. 833085-3/2005; Clayton, supra note 36.
222. In re Suı́ça, No. 833085-3/2005; Clayton, supra note 36; Heron Jose De
Santana Gordilho, Wildlife and the Brazilian Abolitionist Movement, 5 J. ANIMAL L. 71,
82 (2009).
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continue to be discussed . . . . The topic will not die with this writ,
it will certainly continue to remain controversial.223

As Suı́ça’s case demonstrates, the law is dynamic and adapta
ble and should change to reflect public attitudes about animals.
III. EVOLVING ATTITUDES, EVOLVING LAWS: ILLUMINATING
LEGISLATIVE CONTRADICTIONS & INADEQUACIES
Movements for social justice disrupt what is socially and legally
permissible. Historically, extending legal rights to a new entity or
group of individuals has been unthinkable for some members of so
ciety and, thus, is met with resistance.224 This is not surprising
because
each time there is a movement to confer rights onto some new
“entity,” the proposal is bound to sound odd or frightening or
laughable. This is partly because until the rightless thing receives
its rights, we cannot see it as anything but a thing for the use of
“us”—those who are holding rights at the time.225

The social movement to confer rights on women, for example,
seemed odd or laughable to some people in the late 1800s to the
mid-1900s.
A comparison of the social movement to confer legal protec
tions and rights on animals and the women’s rights movement
reveals that there was a mindset about the property status of wo
men that is strikingly similar to the current mindset of the property
status of animals. This mindset evolved over time so that women
were no longer perceived as property, which caused a shift in law.
Similarly, there is a shift occurring in the mindset of the general
public that some animals are more than things. In addition, more of
the human population perceives primates, in particular great apes,
as intelligent, emotional, social beings. Finally, there is an evolving
attitude regarding animals’ experience of pain. These shifts in pub
lic perception and attitude require a reexamination of the AWA and
its accompanying regulations.
Contradiction is a theme in animal protective legislation, which
partly explains why such legislation is inadequate. These contradic
223. In re Suı́ça, No. 833085-3/2005 (emphasis added); see also Clayton, supra
note 36; Gordilho, supra note 222, at 82; The Entitlement of Chimpanzees, supra note 8,
at 279.
224. CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING? 3 (1996).
225. Id. at 5.
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tions originate, in part, from humans’ speciesest belief system.226
The AWA, for example, contains provisions that allow painful and
distressing procedures, which contradicts the stated purpose of “hu
mane care and treatment” of animals.227 These exceptions arise in
situations when such procedures are deemed “scientifically neces
sary” or “scientifically justified.”228 In other words, when there is
some human benefit at stake. In this framework, animal welfare is
secondary to human interests. As a result, as Professor Francione
aptly recognizes, when the AWA was enacted and subsequently
amended, “Congress simultaneously created a rule and an excep
tion that was broad enough to swallow the rule.”229 In practice, the
AWA fails to adequately protect the physical integrity of animals
and the psychological well-being of primates because there are ex
ceptions built into the law that undermine their protection and hu
mane treatment.
A. The Social Movement to Confer Legal Protections and Rights
on Animals is Met with Resistance Similar to that
Encountered by the Women’s Rights Movement
Historically, women were legally powerless in American soci
ety. In 1908, the Supreme Court stated, “history discloses the fact
that woman has always been dependent upon man.”230 Similar to
animals, women were considered property; they were owned and
controlled by their fathers and husbands.231 Women were identi
fied by gender, whereas men were identified by humanness.
Granting women access to academic institutions, for example,
was strongly resisted. The ideology behind this gender inequality
was based on an understanding that education had a detrimental
physical effect on a woman’s reproductive ability; thus, some of so
ciety believed that women’s access to education threatened the per
petuation of the human race.232 In Muller v. Oregon, the Court
stated, “healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the
226. See supra note 12 (definition of speciesism).
227. See Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2131 (2006).
228. Id. § 2143(a)(3)(C)(v).
229. FRANCIONE, supra note 7, at 205.
230. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908).
231. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 41 (1980) (“[A] woman was
regarded as a chattel and denied a separate legal identity.”); Baby v. State, 916 A.2d
410, 422 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007), vacated, 946 A.2d 436 (Md. 2008) (discussing “the
historical notion that, because women were, in legal contemplation, chattel, loss of chas
tity was considered to be a devaluation of a man’s property”).
232. See Muller, 208 U.S. at 421-22.
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physical well-being of woman becomes an object of public interest
and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race.”233
Once women claimed the right to enter academic institutions from
which they were previously excluded, there were massive social and
economic consequences. The private and public spheres were rede
fined, as was the family. Although reproduction did decrease as
women educated themselves and entered the labor market in new
ways, the fate of the human race was not doomed by the social and
economic consequences that flowed from changing gender roles.
In the late 1800s, women met legal resistance to their changing
status in society. Myra Bradwell, for example, was denied admit
tance to practice law by the state of Vermont because she was a
married woman.234 Justice Bradley’s concurring opinion is an illus
tration of the dominant societal attitude toward women’s move
ment out of the private sphere and into the public sphere:
Man is, or should be, woman’s protector and defender. The nat
ural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female
sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life.
The constitution of the family organization, which is founded in
the divine ordinance, as well in the nature of things, indicates the
domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain
and functions of womanhood. The harmony, not to say identity,
of interest and views which belong, or should belong, to the fam
ily institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a
distinct and independent career from that of her husband.235

Charlotte Perkins Stetson Gilman, first-wave feminist and au
thor, argued that the women’s movement of the nineteenth century
first had to declare “that women are persons!”236 This is not to
suggest that animals should be granted access to academic institu
tions, admitted to the practice of law, or declared persons, but to
highlight a changing understanding of women’s property status and
233. Id. at 421.
234. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 131 (1872). The Supreme Court affirmed
the lower court decision and found that such refusal was within the state’s power and
did not violate the Constitution because the right to practice law was not a privilege or
immunity of a citizen of the United States. Id. at 138-39; see also Ex parte Lockwood,
154 U.S. 116, 116-18 (1894) (denying a petition for a mandamus requiring the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia to admit petitioner, a woman, to practice law); In re
Goodell, 1875 WL 3615, at *8 (Wis. Aug. 1875) (“We cannot but think the common law
wise in excluding women from the profession of the law.”).
235. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141.
236. CHARLOTTE PERKINS STETSON, WOMEN AND ECONOMICS: A STUDY OF THE
ECONOMIC RELATION BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN AS A FACTOR IN SOCIAL EVOLU
TION 49 (Carl N. Degler ed., 1966).
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how the past social and legal status women occupied seems outra
geous today.
The women’s rights movement initially “sound[ed] odd or
frightening or laughable”237 to some because it challenged what was
socially and legally permissible. First- and second-wave feminists
were met with strong resistance, which was grounded in years of
ideology that supported a gender imbalance, the disruption of
which had vast social and economic consequences. Despite this, the
women’s rights movement changed social and legal norms. Women
obtained access to education and the labor market; they gained re
productive control; they attained the right to own property, con
tract, divorce, vote, and to defend their right to bodily integrity.
Women’s status as property changed when society began thinking
about women differently, when society began treating women dif
ferently. Changes in the law followed, because “the law evolves
from the way society thinks and behaves.”238
B. Allowing Unfettered Research to Advance Human Interests at
the Expense of Animal Welfare Undermines the AWA’s
Protective Purpose
The attempt to balance human and nonhuman animal interests
creates a contradiction that is at the root of the AWA. This balanc
ing act was clearly expressed from the passage of the AWA’s prede
cessor, the LAWA, as is evident from a House Conference Report,
which states that efforts had been made to create
an effective bill which will codify the noblest and most compas
sionate concern that the human heart holds for those small ani
mals whose very existence is dedicated to the advancement of
medical skill and knowledge while at the same time still preserv
ing for the medical and research professions an unfettered oppor
tunity to carry forward their vital work in behalf of all
mankind.239

Compassion for animals was expressed in the same breath that
characterized them as existing for the purpose of advancing medical
science. Furthermore, the same legislation that limited or restricted
research facilities to ensure humane handling, care, and treatment
237. STONE, supra note 224, at 5.
238. Clayton, supra note 36.
239. H.R. REP. NO. 89-1848, at 6 (1966) (Conf. Rep.), available at http://www.
nal.usda.gov/awic/pubs/AWA2007/confrep_aug1966.pdf; see also Medlock v. Bd. of Trs.
of Univ. of Mass., 580 N.E.2d 387, 388 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (“The Act balances soci
ety’s commitment to the humane treatment of animals with its need for research.”).
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of animals also allowed unfettered research that was considered to
be vital to humankind.240 This echoes the argument that women’s
access to education threatened the perpetuation of the human
race.241
In 1970, a House committee report balanced interests similar
to those balanced by the passage of LAWA.242 The purpose of the
proposed bill was stated, in part, to
establish[ ] by law the humane ethic that animals should be ac
corded the basic creature comforts of adequate housing, ample
food and water, reasonable handling, decent sanitation, sufficient
ventilation, shelter from extremes of weather and temperature,
and adequate veterinary care including the appropriate use of
pain-killing drugs. At the same time this ethic is embraced, the
bill recognizes the responsibility and specifically preserves the
necessary domain of the medical community. The bill in no man
ner authorizes the disruption or interference with scientific re
search or experimentation. Under this bill the research scientist
still holds the key to the laboratory door. This committee and the
Congress, however, expect that the work that’s done behind that
laboratory door will be done with compassion and with care.243

Again, compassion is tempered by a reservation allowing for great
deference to research facilities. The AWA authorizes the humane
use of animals, which creates a tension between using animals and
ensuring their welfare. This tension will almost always give on the
side of human use and at the expense of animals’ welfare. Viola
tions of the AWA are evidence that what is done behind the labora
tory door is not always done with compassion and care.244
Furthermore, intentionally conducting painful procedures and with
holding pain-killing drugs is not compassionate care.
240. The LAWA required that the United States Department of Agriculture
establish and promulgate standards to govern the humane handling, care,
treatment, and transportation of animals by dealers and research facilities . . . .
The foregoing shall not be construed as authorizing the Secretary to prescribe
standards for the handling, care, or treatment of animals during actual re
search or experimentation by a research facility as determined by such re
search facility.
Laboratory Animal Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 89-544, 80 Stat. 350 (1966) (current ver
sion at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (2006)) (emphasis added); see also FRANCIONE, supra
note 7, at 192.
241. See supra notes 232-233 and accompanying text.
242. H.R. REP. NO. 91-1651 (1970), available at http://www.animallaw.info/
administrative/adushrep91_1651_1970.htm.
243. Id. (emphasis added).
244. See supra notes 154-157 and accompanying text.
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In International Primate Protection League v. Institute for Be
havioral Research, Inc., the Fourth Circuit, discussing the plaintiff’s
lack of standing under the AWA, stated,
The [Animal Welfare] Act seeks to insure that “animals intended
for use in research facilities . . . are provided humane care and
treatment.” . . . There is no indication, however, that Congress
intended this goal to come at the expense of progress in medical
research. To the contrary, both the language of the statute and
the means chosen by Congress to enforce it preserve the hope
that responsible primate research holds for the treatment and
cure of humankind’s most terrible afflictions.245

Preserving this hope, in this case, came tragically at the expense of
the primates involved.246 Taub, the defendant, “was studying the
capacity of monkeys to learn to use a limb after nerves had been
severed.”247 Pacheco, the complainant, observed the horrific exper
iments that the Silver Spring Monkeys were subjected to and the
conditions in which they were confined.248 Describing the “acute
noxious stimuli test,” Pacheco stated,
I was to take a monkey . . . and strap him into a homemade im
mobilizing chair, where he would be held at the waist, ankles,
wrists and neck. The acute noxious stimuli were to be applied
with a pair of haemostats (surgical pliers) clamped and fastened
on to the animal, and locked to the tightest notch. I was to ob
serve which parts of the monkey’s body felt pain. . . .249

Pacheco, recalling a conversation he had with one of Taub’s stu
dents about the “acute noxious stimuli test,” stated that one of the
monkeys
had been in such bad shape that he had begun to mutilate his
own chest cavity, and she then confided that putting him in a
245. Int’l Primate Prot. League v. Inst. for Behavioral Research, Inc., 799 F.2d
934, 939 (4th Cir. 1986); see also Salk v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. A120289, 2008
WL 5274536, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (“Congress intended that the federal AWA
ensure that those animals used in research facilities are humanely treated. However,
Congress did not intend this goal to be achieved at the expense of progress in medical
research. The AWA was intended both to protect animal welfare and to subordinate
animal welfare to the continued independence of research scientists. In this scheme,
‘the research scientist still holds the key to the laboratory door.’ Thus, Congress bal
anced competing goals when enacting the AWA.” (internal citation omitted) (quoting
H.R. REP. 91-1654 (1970)) (citing Int’l Primate Prot. League, 799 F.2d 934)).
246. See supra notes 135-137 and accompanying text.
247. Int’l Primate Prot. League, 799 F.2d at 936.
248. See supra notes 135-137 and accompanying text.
249. Pacheco & Francione, supra note 135, at 138.
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restraining device, and administering the noxious stimuli test,
with his chest ripped open, and having to experience the stench
of his rotting body, was the most disgusting thing she had ever
done. After the acute pain test, she said, he was destroyed.250

This was not responsible primate research. This was not research
done with compassion and care. And the only “humane care and
treatment”251 this particular primate received was euthanasia after
the research was concluded.
In the context of animal welfare, language such as “responsible
research” and “humane treatment” is ironic. The competing goals
of animal welfare and independence of research scientists cannot
both be satisfied.
C. Inadequate Environmental Enhancements to Promote the
Psychological Well-being of Primates
The AWA gives research facilities wide latitude in implement
ing the requirement of environmental enhancements adequate to
promote the psychological well-being of primates.252 This latitude
means that those conducting the research are responsible for deter
mining what is adequate in order to meet minimum requirements.
“Some facilities claim their environment enhancement programs
are adequate because there are no distressing behaviors or appear
ances of ill health with their primates.”253 But, “waiting to improve
a minimally enriched environment” to minimize or manage psycho
logical distress as it presents is contrary to the purpose of promot
ing psychological well-being and “was not the intent of the Animal
Welfare Act.”254
In addition to this latitude, there are two exemptions to the
environmental enhancement requirement. First, a primate may be
exempted “from participation in the environment enhancement
plan because of its health or condition, or in consideration of its
well-being.”255 Second, a primate may be exempted “from partici
pation in some or all of the otherwise required environment en
hancement plans for scientific reasons set forth in the research
250. Id. at 139.
251. See Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2131 (2006).
252. See id.; 9 C.F.R. § 3.81 (2010).
253. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPEC
TION SERVICE, FINAL REPORT ON ENVIRONMENT ENHANCEMENT TO PROMOTE THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL WELL-BEING OF NONHUMAN PRIMATES (1999), http://www.nal.usda.
gov/awic/enrichment/Enviromental_Enhancement_NonHuman_Primates.htm#intent.
254. Id.
255. 9 C.F.R § 3.81(e)(1) (emphasis added).
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proposal.”256 The first exemption involves the interests of the pri
mate. The second exemption involves the interests of humans. The
second exemption undermines the protection and humane treat
ment of primates and demonstrates that human interests can still be
advanced at the expense of animal welfare.
As Amy Kerwin, a former primate researcher, illustrates, in
practice the AWA’s requirement of environmental enhancement
sometimes fails to adequately promote the psychological well-being
of primates:
When I began working at the laboratory . . . the monkeys had
wood in their cages. The wood was removed, however, because
the shreds of wood (from being over-manipulated) were clogging
the drains . . . . I tried to ask if the research facility could start
providing wood again since the monkeys used it so much. I men
tioned that a branch was one of the few things the monkeys do
not get tired of . . . . The majority of the researchers voted to not
supply the wood, however, because it was too inconvenient and
time-consuming. A more convenient form of enrichment was to
provide the monkeys with durable plastic toys . . . . Despite the
toy . . . enrichment, abnormal behavior was still present in many
of the monkeys. The behaviors included pacing, back-flipping,
rocking, self-biting, and fur-plucking.257

The abnormal behavior that these rhesus monkeys exhibited shows
that the enrichment provided is inadequate. The AWA’s environ
mental enhancement requirements should not be compromised for
the sake of laboratory staff convenience.
The Humane Society of the United States (HSUS), in a ninemonth (December 2007-September 2008) undercover investigation
of the federally-funded New Iberia Research Center of the Univer
sity of Louisiana at Lafayette, “reveal[ed] routine and unlawful mis
treatment of hundreds of chimpanzees and other primates.”258 The
HSUS has submitted a 108-page complaint to the USDA, which al
leges at least 338 violations of the AWA.259 Videotape evidence260
from the investigation
256.
257.

Id. § 3.81(e)(2) (emphasis added).
AMY KERWIN, IMPROVING ANIMAL WELFARE AND DATA ACCURACY IN
PRIMATE RESEARCH LABORATORIES: DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE
USDA, THE IACUCS, AND THE RESEARCH FUNDING INSTITUTIONS 20 (2005) (report
submitted to the USDA, Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees, and research
funding agencies for the purpose of refining procedures and improving animal welfare
in primate research institutions) (on file with author).
258. Investigation Reveals Abuse of Chimps, supra note 173.
259. Id.
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shows severe distress of primates in isolation: They engage in
self-mutilation by tearing gaping wounds into their arms and legs,
a behavior that could be the result of New Iberia Research
Center’s failure to provide adequate environmental enhance
ment. Routine procedures, such as the use of powerful and pain
ful dart guns and frightening squeeze cages for sedation, are
shown causing acute psychological distress to chimpanzees and
monkeys. Infant monkeys scream as they are forcibly removed
from their mothers so that tubes can be forced down their
throats. Altogether, the investigation reveals animals forced to
endure anxiety and misery behind the razor wire of the research
facility.261

The AWA recognizes that primates need psychological en
hancements. This belief illuminates our understanding of primates
as more than mere objects or things, but rather as intelligent, emo
tional, social beings. Despite this recognition, this provision of the
AWA, in practice, fails to adequately protect those needs.
D. Humans’ Interpretation of How Animals Experience Pain
Allows for an Enormous Amount of Suffering Under the
AWA
Seventeenth century French philosopher René Descartes de
scribed animals as machines like clocks, lacking reason and incapa
ble of experiencing pain.262 Descartes’ philosophy was a mindset
that accompanied the growth of vivisection263 in Europe during the
seventeenth century.264 In addition, that philosophy illustrates the
roots of current human understanding of animal pain within the
context of vivisection. Although human understanding of animals
260. Id.; see Primate Investigation, Undercover Investigation at Research Lab,
supra note 35 (video of “undercover investigation by the Humane Society of the United
States[, which] reveals psychological suffering of primates in research laboratories”).
261. Investigation Reveals Abuse of Chimps, supra note 173.
262. PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION 200 (1975) (citing RENÉ DESCARTES,
DISCOURSE ON METHOD, Vol. V).
263. Vivisection is the practice of experimenting on living animals. MERRIAM
WEBSTER’S, supra note 12, at 1400.
264. SINGER, supra note 262, at 201.
They administered beatings to dogs with perfect indifference, and made fun of
those who pitied the creatures as if they felt pain. They said the animals were
clocks; that the cries they emitted when struck were only the noise of a little
spring that had been touched, but that the whole body was without feeling.
They nailed poor animals up on boards by their four paws to vivisect them and
see the circulation of the blood . . . .
Id. at 201-02 (quoting an eyewitness account of vivisection in the late seventeenth cen
tury that illustrates Descartes’s theory in practice).
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and their experience of pain has evolved since Descartes’ time,
remnants of the roots of his philosophy are evident in the language
of protective legislation today, which recognizes, and then mini
mizes, or navigates around, animals’ experience of pain.
This minimization is tied to the scientific justification that re
search on primates, for example, is valuable and necessary because
they are similar to humans, but dissimilar enough that their physical
and emotional integrity can be navigated around.265 According to
Kerwin, “It was often argued in the laboratory that rhesus monkeys
were valuable research subjects because they were closely related
to humans. When it came to the animal’s welfare, however, state
ments were made by [laboratory staff] that the monkeys ‘have a
high pain tolerance’ and a ‘different pain system.’”266 As a result of
this disconnected and contradictory position, “chimpanzees [and
other primates] are treated as if they are unfeeling machines.”267
The AWA inadequately protects animals because it explicitly
makes exceptions regarding the humane treatment of animals used
in research facilities that are contradictory to the purported pur
pose of protecting animals. The Secretary of Agriculture must pro
mulgate standards “for animal care, treatment, and practices in
experimental procedures to assure that animal pain and distress are
minimized.”268 This provision acknowledges that experimental pro
cedures sometimes result in pain and distress. It does not, however,
prohibit such painful and distressing procedures; instead, it requires
practices that minimize such pain and distress. Furthermore, “in
any practice which could cause pain to animals . . . the withholding
of tranquilizers, anesthesia, analgesia, or euthanasia when scientifi
cally necessary shall continue for only the necessary period of
time.”269 Again, this provision acknowledges that some procedures
cause animals pain. And again, it does not prohibit such painful
procedures; instead, it allows the withholding of pain-relieving
drugs when scientifically necessary. Thus, an animal may be sub
jected to a painful and distressing experiment for as long as it takes
to achieve a scientific objective, which is defined as some benefit to
265. Fouts & Fouts, supra note 63, at 39.
266. KERWIN, supra note 257, at 25.
267. Fouts & Fouts, supra note 63, at 39.
268. Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(3)(A) (2006) (emphasis added).
269. Id. § 2143(a)(3)(C), (C)(v) (emphasis added); see PAIN TYPE: TOTAL 2009,
supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text (USDA 2009 report of number of animals used
in painful procedures whose pain was not alleviated because pain-relieving drugs would
have interfered with or compromised the research).
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the human population. The allowance of withholding relief from
pain contradicts the goal of humane treatment.
Because Congress did not define “pain,”270 APHIS, the agency
responsible for administration of the AWA, through its Animal
Care program, developed a policy regarding painful procedures.271
Regulations have also been promulgated regarding painful proce
dures.272 These kinds of policies and regulations indicate a recogni
tion that (1) animals suffer as a result of laboratory research; and
(2) guidelines to attempt to eliminate this suffering are necessary.
Policy 11 of the Animal Care Policy Manual defines painful
procedures “as any procedure that would reasonably be expected to
cause more than slight or momentary pain and/or distress in a
human being to which that procedure is applied.”273 This policy
requires that “[a]nimals exhibiting signs of pain, discomfort, or dis
tress . . . receive appropriate relief unless written scientific justifica
tion is provided in the animal activity proposal and approved by the
[Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee] IACUC.”274
Under Policy 11, animals are relieved of pain, discomfort, or dis
tress unless there is scientific justification for their pain, discomfort,
or distress.275
The Secretary must promulgate rules and regulations that al
low AC
inspectors to confiscate or destroy in a humane manner any
animal found to be suffering as a result of a failure to comply
with any provision of [the AWA] or any regulation or standard
issued thereunder if . . . such animal is held by a research facility
270. See Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2132.
271. See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., POLICY 11: PAINFUL PROCEDURES (1997) [here
inafter POLICY 11], available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_welfare/downloads/
policy/policy11.pdf.
272. A proposal to use animals in research, for example, must contain
[a] description of procedures designed to assure that discomfort and pain to
animals will be limited to that which is unavoidable for the conduct of scientifi
cally valuable research, including [a] provision for the use of analgesic, anes
thetic, and tranquilizing drugs where indicated and appropriate to minimize
discomfort and pain to animals.
9 C.F.R § 2.31(e)(4) (2010) (emphasis added). Also, “[p]rocedures that may cause
more than momentary or slight pain or distress to . . . animals . . . [must b]e performed
with appropriate sedatives, analgesics or anesthetics, unless withholding such agents is
justified for scientific reasons, in writing, by the principal investigator and will continue
for only the necessary period of time.” 9 C.F.R § 2.31(d)(iv), (iv)(A) (emphasis added).
273. POLICY 11, supra note 271, at 11.1.
274. Id. at 11.1-11.2 (emphasis added).
275. Id. at 11.2.
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and is no longer required by such research facility to carry out the
research, test, or experiment for which such animal has been
utilized.276

In other words, inspectors may confiscate or destroy animals that
are in distress as long as they are no longer useful for the experi
ment that is causing them distress.277
The Animal Care policy regarding painful procedures is prob
lematic for three reasons. One, an animal’s pain and distress is
measured against a human standard. A painful procedure is de
fined “as any procedure that would reasonably be expected to cause
more than slight or momentary pain and/or distress in a human be
ing to which that procedure is applied.”278 Two, an animal exhibit
ing signs of pain, discomfort, or distress may be denied appropriate
relief if there is scientific justification.279 In this framework, an
animal will almost always lose because benefits to humans typically
are understood to outweigh an animal’s welfare. Three, because an
animal cannot verbally communicate their pain and distress, labora
tory staff must mostly rely on their clinical observations of objective
measures of pain, discomfort, and distress, which include the exhibi
tion of “decreased appetite [or] activity level, adverse reactions to
touching inoculated areas, open sores [or] necrotic skin lesions, ab
scesses, lameness, conjunctivitis, corneal edema, and photopho
bia.”280 These objective measures fail, in part, because they
indicate a level of pain, discomfort, and distress that is well beyond
the threshold at which such suffering begins to occur. Rather, these
objective measures suggest that enough suffering has already oc
curred that there is now a visible indication of it.
As the AWA is currently written and interpreted administra
tively, there is wide space for justifying animal suffering. If there is
scientific justification, an animal may be subjected to painful and
distressing experiments.281 The minimized pain and necessary time
276. Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2146(a) (2006) (emphasis added); see also 9
C.F.R. § 2.129.
277. Salk v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. A120289, 2008 WL 5274536, at *5
n.10 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (“Department inspectors have the power to remove a suffer
ing animal from a research facility, but only if that animal is no longer required by the
research facility to carry out its research.”).
278. POLICY 11, supra note 271, at 11.1 (emphasis added).
279. Policy 11 requires that “[a]nimals exhibiting signs of pain, discomfort, or dis
tress . . . receive appropriate relief unless written scientific justification is provided in the
animal activity proposal and approved by the IACUC.” Id. at 11.2 (emphasis added).
280. Id.
281. See Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2143 (a)(3)(C)(v).
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provisions of the AWA282 and the accompanying regulations283 au
thorize torture284 of animals. According to a common understand
ing and a legal definition of torture, minimized and scientifically
necessary pain and distress can be interpreted as torture.285 When
deemed scientifically necessary, the infliction of intense pain to the
body or mind of an animal may be used to extract information.286
Information, in this context, is scientific knowledge extracted from
the bodies of animals.
CONCLUSION
The social movement to guarantee humane treatment and con
fer legal rights on nonhuman animals may seem odd or laughable to
some. But the portion of the human population that recognizes
that animals, particularly primates, deserve to be treated with com
passion, dignity, and respect is growing. And the law will slowly,
but eventually, change to reflect that growing commitment to pro
tect animals.
Currently, animal protective legislation is human-focused,
which conflicts with its purported purpose of protecting animals.
Granting animals legal protections and rights is about treating them
with respect and compassion, about ensuring dignity, bodily integ
rity, and freedom from invasive research. Ideally, protective legis
lation would put an end to all animal suffering. This, however, is an
unreasonable short-term goal in light of the massive economic and
social restructuring necessary to achieve that goal. As an alterna
tive, and a beginning, protective legislation should begin by banning
all great ape invasive research and eventually phase out all primate
invasive research. All chimpanzees currently confined in research
facilities should be retired to sanctuaries where they can live out the
remainder of their lives in dignity and free from further suffering.
And as invasive research is phased out, all primates should be re
tired to sanctuaries.
282. The AWA requires the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate standards
“for animal care, treatment, and practices in experimental procedures to ensure that
animal pain and distress are minimized.” Id. § 2143 (a)(3)(A) (emphasis added). Fur
thermore, “in any practice which could cause pain to animals . . . the withholding of
tranquilizers, anesthesia, analgesia, or euthanasia when scientifically necessary shall
continue for only the necessary period of time.” Id. § 2143 (a)(3)(C)(v) (emphasis
added).
283. See supra note 272.
284. See supra note 38.
285. Id.
286. Id.
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Efforts to guarantee humane treatment and confer legal rights
on animals have primarily been driven by a theory of welfare or
rights. A framework for welfare-based laws sometimes falls short
of its intended goal because of contradicting, competing interests.
A framework for rights-based laws sometimes falls short because of
an entrenched understanding of property, persons, and standing.
An alternative to the current framework of welfare- or rights-based
laws is a theory based on care.
A care-based framework has the potential to disrupt the
speciesist ideology that continues to support the current balancing
of interests. Compassion alone is not sufficient; however, decon
structing speciesist ideology requires compassion. Compassion for
the dogs who were being victimized was the momentum that cre
ated change in 1966 with the passage of the Laboratory Animal
Welfare Act. Compassion was the fuel behind subsequent amend
ments to the Animal Welfare Act. The law changed when people
witnessed the atrocities behind the laboratory door. As the history
and evolution of the AWA demonstrates, the way society thinks and
behaves is shaped, in part, by compassion. And the law “evolves
from the way society thinks and behaves.”287
A care-based framework pays attention to what animals are
already communicating. Our laws need to evolve to reflect our
changing knowledge and understanding of animals.288 “We should
not kill, . . . torture, and exploit animals because they do not want
to be so treated, and we know that. If we listen we can hear
them.”289 Bruno clearly communicated this when he signed from
the cage he was confined in: “KEY OUT.”290
Karina L. Schrengohst*

287. Clayton, supra note 36.
288. See Tribunal do Juri
´ de Salvador [Jury Court of Salvador], No.833085-3/2005,
In re Suı́ça, Correio da Bahia, 19.9.2005 (Brazil), English translation, available at http://
www.animallaw.info/nonus/cases/cabrsuicaeng2005.htm, Portuguese decision available
at http://www.animallaw.info/nonus/cases/cabrsuicapt2005.htm; Clayton, supra note 36.
289. Donovan, supra note 20, at 375.
290. FOUTS & MILLS, supra note 15, at 354.
* J.D., Western New England University School of Law, 2011; Editor-in-Chief,
Western New England Law Review, Volume 33. Thank you to the staff of Volume 33
for all of your hard work and dedication. Thank you Joshua, for your love and laughter.
And, in loving memory of my mother, Janet, to whom this Note is dedicated.
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